242 
tion of administration and policymaking.''*? The top leadership can 
make decisions on the rate of growth or key areas for investment. 
It can review economic performance and exert pressure to make plans 
tighter. Gosplan, however, is more than an instrument for translating 
decisions and monitoring their fulfillment. It has the organization to 
handle planning, the coordination of planning, and coordination of 
a multitude of industrial and functional areas. It is frequently presented 
as the nerve center of the planning system. As overseer of national 
economic interests, Gosplan has powers of influencing policymaking 
and implementation at the very highest levels. Its extensive powers 
have been confirmed in criticism of Gosplan operations by the top 
party leadership.'"* ‘ 
Much of the more detailed formulation and planning on investment 
priorities is conducted by individual ministries and state committees 
concerned with particular issues. Ministries and enterprises submit 
and review plans and are consulted in the planning process. They 
participate in various stages of both short- and long- term planning. 
The variety of interests and the limited resources produces stiff com- 
petition. Ministries are frequently criticized for promoting individual 
branch welfare above the general interests of the entire economy. 
Enterprises have also been criticized for promoting self-serving poli- 
cies, such as setting low plan targets in order to easily overfulfill 
them and earn undeserved bonuses. 
One of Gosplan’s main roles is to coordinate the work of other 
economic planning bodies in order to provide for planned and propor- 
tional economic development. In the words of a Soviet economist, 
‘““Only Gosplan, as the central planning body, represents the interests 
of the national economy as a whole, is free from agency and local 
onesidedness, can completely consider the real resources and assure 
the effectiveness of decisions taken.”’'’? The ministries’ functional in- 
terests can produce narrowly focused policy orientation. Gosplan is 
to provide a balance to the demands of the different ministries. The 
very close coordinating processes and personnel overlap, however, 
may produce linkages resulting in conflicts of interest. A. Ishkov, 
Minister of Fisheries and in managerial positions with the fishing indus- 
try since 1930, for example, was head of the Gosplan Fisheries Depart- 
ment from 1937 to 1960.'!® The personnel overlap may indicate sig- 
nificant ministerial control over economic planning and policymaking. 
At the very least, it indicates a conflict of interest in Gosplan’s role 
as coordinator. 
In most cases, Gosplan is assigned the role of coordinating planning 
"™3See David Lane, “Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R."" (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1970), p. 275 ff. for a discussion. 
"4Hahn, for example, describes Brezhnev’s 1968 complaint concerning Gosplan siphoning funds 
meant for agricultural investment and using them for other purposes, p. 194. See also pp. 167-77 for 
debates between the political leadership and Gosrlan. 
''°G. Kosiachenko (Between 1940-57. Deputy and First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan) “Some 
Questions About Proportional Economy as the Main Task of Gosplan.”” Planovoe Khoziaistvo, Janu- 
ary 1971, p. 76. : 
* 6 United States JPRS, ‘““Contemporary Biographies,” p. 160. 
