253 
Aside from the increasingly complex and difficult decisions required 
by the modern industrial state, other constraints on party power in 
policy leadership and guidance exist. There are many indications that 
the party is not a unitary leader. Although a tendency toward consen- 
sus politics is present in the Soviet Union, an increasing amount 
of literature documents the fragmentation and differing policy objec- 
tives at the top levels of the CPSU and the use of policy conflicts 
for political positioning. ‘““To govern is to choose.”’ 
Along with the problems of disagreement within the top party 
leadership, there are differences of opinion on the appropriate policy 
or procedures at the various other levels of power. The role of Soviet 
government institutions as a source of independent interests and policy 
preferences is a relatively unstudied area. The exercise of ministries’ 
administrative prerogatives can result in policymaking powers. The 
execution and formulation of policies are part of a continuous process. 
Administration carries many implicit policymaking duties and it entails 
implementation, information input, and actual policymaking. The 
Soviet state apparatus is usually presented as merely an administrative 
system implementing Party directives. State powers in policy decisions, 
however, are greater than generally assumed, particularly since techni- 
cal and management issues have policy implications. The process of 
implementation itself also impacts on policymaking.!”° The execution 
of the 5 Year Plan provides many opportunities for the alteration 
or sabotage of the party’s objectives The imposition of unwanted 
plans and goals produces manipulation and distortion of production 
inputs and outputs. Experience shows that directives often do not 
achieve their objectives and that appropriate incentives must be 
designed and specialists consulted in order to achieve desired goals. 
In addition to state administrative authority and implicit policymak- 
ing powers, the overlapping and conflicting jurisdiction between the 
party and state further work to confuse precise duties and complicate 
procedures. Soviet ocean policy is not the product of a centralized 
agency or decisionmaking process. Although top political leaders main- 
tain the right to set national policy, and make attempts to at least 
coordinate the policymaking process, Soviet institutions with ocean 
interests participate in ocean policy formulation. 
179Richard Cornell has summarized the powers deriving from implementation: “‘It is one thing for a 
small elite, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to arrogate to itself the function of political 
leadership. It is another for the decisions reached by this elite to be implemented efficiently and ef- 
fectively. The manner of implementation, especially the broader and more general the decision, often 
becomes in itself an act of decisionmaking. The way in which details are filled in, or broad policy 
statements or goals are interpreted, can affect the spirit if not the letter of the decision. In a country 
as large and as populous as the Soviet Union, with a complex and sophisticated economy, it is im- 
possible for the decisionmakers themselves to serve also as the implementors and administrators.” 
Richard Cornell, ed., The Soviet Political System (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), 
p. 244. 
