259 
(la) The civilian fleets have clearly not been organizationally, struc- 
turally integrated with the navy proper. They each have functionally 
autonomous administrative structures, whose ongoing concerns focus 
on the attainment of civilian tasks, and on the successful meeting 
of economic plan quotas and requirements. Each has its own func- 
tional research facilities, and its own specialized personnel training 
schools. 
It is known that a certain number of military advisers or consultants 
are attached to the higher planning organs of the civilian fleets, and 
that a certain number of both their oceangoing personnel and their 
school instructors are drawn from reservist ranks (as also in a number 
of Western countries). But exact figures are inaccessible. It is further- 
more presumed that a certain, small number of active naval personnel 
are assigned to the civilian fleets, to operate the more sensitive types 
of equipment, and to ensure that the maximum military relevance 
is wrought from dual-purpose equipment. Yet again, exact numbers, 
not to mention job descriptions, are not available. 
As concerns equipment there are obvious inferences to be drawn 
from the traditional heavy Soviet stress on standardization, and inter- 
changeability of parts. Hulls, engines, radars, sonars etc. are procured 
through defense industry ministries such as shipbuilding, medium 
machine building and general machine building, and radio and elec- 
tronics. Specifications from civilian fleet organs are channeled through 
the military industrial commission, which is presumed to be responsible 
for the meshing of civilian and naval requirements. 
Thus some shipyards, quays and other port facilities are highly 
specialized, and functionally oriented to the satisfaction of the peculiar 
demands of particular fleet branches (such as refrigeration trawlers, 
container transports and/or elements of the submarine forces.)’ But 
when dictated by calculations of optimality, economics, or expediency, 
integration of facilities has been and is encouraged: it is, for example, 
known that Leningrad’s Admiralty and Baltic yards have ongoing ex- 
tensive shipbuilding programs of both civilian and military character, 
as the city’s Sudomekh complex probably does.*® 
(1b) It is believed that the day-to-day coordination of military and: 
civilian tasks is conducted through special committees within the’ 
responsible ministries, committees which in the civilian ministries 
count naval representatives among their members, and which rely 
heavily on the ‘‘Automatic Control System’? (ACS) as a conduit both 
for collation of data and for dissemination of decisions. But there 
is little doubt that civilian concerns predominate within these minis- 
tries. There must therefore be recourse to higher authority in cases 
where military requirements burst the seams of established coordinat- 
ing procedures. 
In such instances there is reason to doubt the relevance of the 
military-industrial commission. It is thought that its independent 
authority is restricted to the more technical considerations of compati- 
bility evaluation and standardization, and that it otherwise functions 
primarily as an interdepartmental flow of information. It has been 
i 7See i.e., treatment by Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, Izdat. Pishevaya Pro- 
lmyshlennost, Moscow, 1970. 
®M. MccGwire, Chapter 23 of Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, Praeger, 1974, for 
further references, see therein cited footnotes. 
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