260 
delegated procedural and policy-supervising authority. But novel policy 
decision remains the prerogative of higher authorities. In cases such 
as here intimated one thinks of the Ministry of Defense (and through 
it the General Staff) and the Council of Ministers—with decisions 
of principle being referred right up to the Politburo apex (in the 
first instance to Ustinov’s staff; if necessary to the Politburo as a 
body. 
(2) As discussed in the analysis proper: 
The merchant fleet is in peacetime expected to provide autonomous 
ocean transport capability; it is expected to provide third countries 
with a strategically important alternative to dependence on capitalist 
transport organs; it is expected to prove an increasingly valuable 
source of foreign exchange; and finally, to project a peaceful, friendly, 
positive image of the mother country. It is furthermore designed to 
provide auxiliary transport potential to the navy, in peace as also 
In war. 
The fishing fleet was procured and expanded as a prime instrument 
of the Khrushchev and current regime’s priority on drastic improve- 
ments in the nation’s dietary patterns, and its protein intake; the 
oceanographic fleets grew in parallel, concentrating first on the 
character and potential of the ocean’s resources, later also on those 
of the ocean floor. Both the fishing and the oceanographic fleets 
were from the beginning assigned certain intelligence duties vis-a- 
vis Western fleet activities. And this monitoring function was sub- 
sequently expanded to reflect the emergence of naval theory and 
capabilities from their erstwhile coastal confines. As Admiral Yakovlev 
testified, these fleets are today charged with major responsibilities 
in the fields of target location, and the securing of optimal submarine 
fleet command and control venues. While the civilian fleets’ economic 
contribution is indisputable and can be chartered, their military func- 
tions, whether passive intelligence or operational collaboration, must 
remain impervious to assessment; too many of the relevant efficiency 
indicators are beclouded by security dictates. 
(3) The economic import of the civilian fleets is documented below. 
They play a vital role in satisfying domestic requirements as regards 
transportation, dietary desiderata and protein needs; for the future 
they furthermore promise to play as significant a role in the procuring 
of mineral and energy resources as they play today in the meeting 
of alimentary aspirations. At the same time, divertible services and 
produce serve as previously noted as valued earners of foreign 
exchange. Since the military relevance of the civilian fleets is not 
quantifiable, neither is the relative ratio between civilian and military 
functions. 
But, with no prejudice to that correlation, it must nevertheless be 
noted that a Soviet reluctance to accommodate naval aspirations detri- 
mental to civilian fleet concerns can be demonstrated. The high priori- 
ty expansion of the navy over the last decade or so, from an onshore 
establishment to one with global means and aspirations, was not al- 
lowed to interfere with the needs of the civilian fleets. Naval yards 
were expanded, some new ones were built, and a measure of naval- 
civilian yard integration was pursued—where, and only where, such 
was considered mutually beneficent and cost-effective. But as a general 
rule it appears that the Soviet Navy has “‘to work within the restricted 
