261 
limits of that it already has’; there is ‘“‘no indication that surface 
yard capacity has been switched from civilian to warship construc- 
tion.”’® And if this is correct, then it would seem that Soviet authorities 
have a rather high appreciation indeed of the economic worth of 
the nonmilitary fleets. 
The conclusion must be that while the civilian fleets have definite 
and important military tasks, such tasks are usually assigned and 
calibrated so as to cause a minimum of disruption to their civilian 
‘assignments. 
(4) As with all Soviet organizations, the civilian fleets have active 
Party branches, and KGB representation; in view of their military 
tasks, and the known presence of a limited number of naval personnel, 
one presumes that larger fleet units also have GRU representatives 
on board to supervise the efficient collating of military-related data. 
But excepting the peculiar role of the GRU and naval personnel 
and functions, there is little evidence to exaggerate the role of either 
the Party or the KGB beyond that enjoyed by these organizations 
in analogous land establishments. In fact, it may be fairest and most 
illustrative to equate the role of Party officers on board Soviet vessels 
to the role of chaplains aboard Western vessels, in numbers as also 
‘in functions. This seems to be the case on naval ships,'!® and there 
appears little reason to think it otherwise on the other fleets’ vessels. 
The case of vessels that frequent foreign ports is different. These 
are believed to have somewhat higher complements of KGB personnel, 
if only because of the Soviet stress on the import of political ap- 
pearances. 
As concerns the political impact of the fleets in general, this is 
two-fold. On the one hand there is this Soviet appreciation of the 
political utility of well-conducted foreign port visits. Of perhaps greater 
importance is the domestic political fallout from the economic con- 
tributions of the civilian fleets, or rather: the political fallout from 
not having to forego these contributions. 
(5) Finally: the capabilities and tasks of the civilian fleets are corre- 
lated with naval requirements to the maximum extent possible without 
placing their nonmilitary endeavors in serious jeopardy. The priority 
assigned to their nonmilitary responsibilities is such that they cannot 
be described as automatic auxiliaries to the armed forces establish- 
ment, except in times of extreme crises. But they are used as natural 
complements. To the extent that their inherent capabilities and normal 
deployment patterns allow them to satisfy routine naval requirements 
at minimum cost to their other tasks, to that extent they are so 
assigned. They provide reserve transport and intelligence monitoring 
capacity; they “‘survey and mark future battlefields;”"' they plan an 
important role in the distribution and control of underwater devices 
of strategic import; and they perform a significant role in the perfect- 
ing of command and control means and practice. 
In times of war their facilities would become appendages to those 
of the navy proper. So also in times of crises: as there was no question 
®°MccGwire, in “Soviet Naval Policy—,” op. cit. 
See Proceedings of Dalhousie University’s 1973 Maritime Seminar (published as Soviet Naval 
Developments: Capability and Context, Praeger, 1973. 
11 Leon Goure’s succinct summary (to this author, on Feb. 17, 1975) of Admiral V. D. Yakovlev’s 
presentation in Sovetskii Flot, (the Soviet Navy), DOSAAF, Moscow, 1969. 
