262 
of Aeroflot capacities being utilized at the time of the 1968 
Czechoslovak intervention, so there was no question of available 
merchant fleet units being used to supplement naval capacities at 
the time of the 1962 Cuban crisis, or i.e. the 1973 Mideast War; 
and there have been numerous analogous examples of fishing and 
research vessels being diverted, to “‘cover’’ major NATO exercises, 
or i.e. to “cover” U.S. Naval activities around Diego Garcia, in the 
Indian Ocean. 
The dual-purpose intent of the civilian fleets does cause some 
headaches from the point of view of Naval planners. The fact that 
they are not automatically divertible without recourse to higher 
authority, without due cause, does place constraints on their special 
purpose potential. The fact that their military tasks have to be 
standardized, or routinized to the maximum possible extent, inevitably 
entails an element of restraint. Nevertheless, this can be lived with, 
as a small price to pay for valued services. 
The pattern of effective coordination is already well-established in 
the northern seas. While it is still undergoing regularized measured 
expansion in southern oceans, the pattern i.e. in the North Atlantic 
appears to be relatively set. In the North Atlantic there is already 
““blanket”’ coverage, and it is probable that any further expansion 
in this area will be such as to reflect qualitative rather than quantita- 
tive advances. 
There may however be developments of note at two extremes of 
the North Atlantic. To the east the kind of direct political fleet 
manipulation witnessed at the time of the British-Icelandic cod war 
and during the Portuguese sardine fishermens’ strike, may prove 
forerunners of future patterns. 
To the west or ‘rather northwest of the Atlantic Soviet activity 
may grow as a result of increasing appreciation of ocean floor resource 
potentials. There is a real “‘danger’’ (to Canada) that Soviet activity 
in the northwestern Atlantic and off Labrador will ‘‘meet’’ Soviet 
Arctic Ocean and ocean bed research and development teams in 
the Canadian Arctic. If one projects from present capabilities, and 
stated interests and concerns, then it is far from farfetched to talk 
of a not-too-distant Soviet ability to mine Canadian Arctic Ocean 
floor areas. One might reasonably doubt whether the U.S.S.R. would 
pioneer such activities in these areas. But in the present situation 
of increasing American interest in their riches, coupled with a 
startlingly desultory Canadian enforcement of her sovereignty claims, 
the U.S.S.R. may not have to engage in chancy, and perhaps provoca- 
tive pioneering; she may be in a position to pursue the international 
law implications of U.S. initiatives. 
INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this study will be on the ‘‘civilian’’ fleets of the 
Soviet Union: the merchant marine; the fishing fleet; the research 
oceanographic fleet(s). Each of the fleets were procured and! 
developed as a result of military as well as economic considerations; 
each is entrusted with military as well as civilian tasks. 
The study will pursue the military import of these fleets, and in- 
vestigate the interrelationship of their civilian and military require- 
ments. It will address itself to the question of relative benefit, relative 
return on investment. It will attempt to clarify the civilian economic 
