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import of the fleets, in order to determine the extent to which their 
emergence might be ascribed to economic criteria alone, or whether 
the explanation must be sought to a greater or lesser extent in strategic 
imperatives (i.e., the question of the opportunity cost of their military 
functions). 
Before delving into this, however, some attention should be paid 
to the subject of military-civilian integration in the U.S.S.R. in general. 
One cannot comment on the case of the civilian fleets in isolation. 
Their character is a direct reflection of more embracing societal con- 
cepts and practice. An appreciation of the determining parameters 
is an essential prerequisite to their evaluation. 
It is also important here to comment on the terminology of the 
title: ‘‘Notes’’ has been employed deliberately to suggest the necessari- 
ly tentative nature of the endeavor. As will be seen from the text, 
there are considerable gaps in the data available to the Western 
analyst; furthermore, some of the data that is available has not been 
accessible for the purposes of this study. The study should therefore 
not be viewed as definitive. At most, it may be seen as a pioneering, 
thought-provoking, collation of some of the relevant data. It is hoped 
that the study may serve to stimulate followup efforts of greater scope, 
with the resources to pursue the many tangential lines of research 
that this study must rest content merely to indicate. 
THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF STRATEGY 
Moscow sees strategy as transcending its military component. She 
defines strategy to reflect the sum total of a nation’s power levers. 
Other levers of essence are to be found in economic might and poten- 
tial, in morale, in cultural and social cohesiveness, etc. Each is but 
a tool, albeit a necessary, and dependent tool. Circumstances of time 
dictate which are to be emphasized, but none can be ignored. They 
are interrelated, intertwined and interdependent.’ 
Soviet leaders have not hesitated to pursue the practical con- 
sequences of their theoretical bias. 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES 
The military-economy sphere is illustrative. The recognition of mili- 
tary strategy’s increasing dependence on the technical and economic 
conditions of the protagonists had profound consequences. It brought 
acceptance of the tenet that “military economists” be added to higher 
military staffs, as well as to the planning and economic organs of 
the state administration. The parochial pursuit of purely military, or 
purely economic objectives would not suffice. One had to coordinate 
the peacetime economy with potential military requirements.” 
Domestically, this entailed a strong stress on basic self-sufficiency, 
autarchy. And it entailed a readiness to sacrifice economic optimality 
on the altar of strategic necessity. Military dispersal and survivability 
12 See i.e., N. N. Azovtsev, V. I. Lenin i Sovetskaya Voennaya Nauka, (V. I. Lenin and Soviet Mili- 
tary Science), Voenizdat Moscow 1971; I. Kh. Bagramian, Istoria voin i voennovo iskusstva (History, 
Soldiers and the Art of War), voenizdat Moscow, 1970; and other Soviet sources, listed in C. G. 
Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy—Soviet Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., MacLehose, Glasgow, 1974. 
13,4. Lagovsky, Strategy and Economy, a Sketch of Their Mutual Interconnection and Influence, 
Voenizdat, Moscow 1957 (translated by U.S. Department of Commerce); or see i.e., A. A. Grechko, 
Na Strazhe Mira i Stroitelstva Kommunisma (On Guarding the World and the Building of Commu- 
nism), Voenizdat, Moscow 1971. 
