265 
and demands of modern war, conventional, chemical-biological, and/or 
nuclear, to minimize panic, and to maximize resistance and survival 
prospects.”° 
And the consequences go further still, as is well-appreciated by 
policymaking bodies. It is generally acknowledged that the high- 
prestige military, acts as a unifying force on a diverse federation, 
complementing the Party’s striving for an all-Union “‘Soviet’’ con- 
‘sciousness—a Soviet rather than (ethnic) Republican sense of identity. 
It may be less widely recognized that positively received paramilitary 
training of civilians also serves to augment discipline in general—a 
side-effect of no little political and economic benefit. Nor should 
one dismiss the potential of the military-patriotic glorification of 
self-sacrifice. (While skepticism may be rampant in some sectors of 
the populace, idealism is not dead; voluntary work campaigns by 
Komsomol and similar groups remain consequential, for harvesting, 
as for the development of Siberian wilderness. ) 
Again, there is an external consideration. Most navies are aware 
of the goodwill potential, when visiting foreign ports, of demonstrable 
morale and discipline. Yet this awareness is rarely a matter of high 
policy priority, as it is for the Soviet Navy. The crucial nature of 
political perception, as distinct from, if not necessarily divorced from 
reality, receives constant attention at the highest levels of Soviet pol- 
icymaking and it finds constant resonance and scrutiny in the nation’s 
media. The 1970 pioneering, worldwide Soviet Naval exercise Okean 
is illustrative; post-maneuver visits to friendly and neutral ports 
received as extensive press coverage as did the maneuver itself.” 
Soviet servicemen are ambassadors. Impeccable standards are de- 
manded. Transgression is a very serious matter indeed, and punished 
accordingly. 
RAMIFICATIONS FOR POLICY-AFFECTING ORGANS 
“Politics is the guiding force, and war (cum economic, social or 
other policies) is only the tool.’’? Policy is set by the Party-dominated 
establishment, into which the upper echelons of the military have 
been absorbed. The military does not constitute an independent, or 
even self-contained wielder of power. There are functional interests 
within the Forces, as between rocket troopers, tank and artillery men, 
between submariners and surface fleet personnel, between administra- 
tors, technicians and journeymen, between Arms, and between geo- 
political circumstances (a Far Eastern posting will have different 
ramifications from a GDR posting). But there is no catholic all-Armed 
Forces interest of jeopardy to Party concern. Rather, Armed Forces 
aspirations complement those of the Party, and are therefore generally 
seen to be best served through the Party. 
There is establishment concensus as to ends. There is less concensus 
as to means, but again the Armed Forces could not be portrayed 
as pitted against the Party. Upper military echelons are not homogene- 
ous. Some are more conservative, some are more flexible, some are 
more willing to accept certain kinds of risks, etc. Again, each grouping 
20 Scott, op. cit. 
21““Okean”’, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1970. 
22V_ I. Lenin, ‘“‘Leniskii Sbornik,’ (Lenin’s Collection). XII, Moscow, 1931, p. 34. 
