266 
finds it advantageous to submerge itself, in an intra-Party led coalition 
of like-minded, if functionally distinct, groups. Military hard-liners 
gain authority through their roles within the more orthodox Party 
faction(s); so also with pragmatists, moderates, and other elements. 
As an example, one might point to the many hard-line, though 
far from unsophisticated, articles by Colonels Bondarenko and Rybkin. 
Again and again these have been labelled ‘‘anti-Party’’ by Western 
editorial writers—in apparent blissful ignorance of the Colonels’ status 
as Party-appointed instructors at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, 
and seemingly oblivious of the small print accompanying the articles 
(which, in the case of the most uncompromising articles, noted that 
they formed part of a special Party lecture series.) Or one might 
point to General Millshtein, of the Institute for the United States 
and Canada. His diplomatic reasonableness in arms control discussions 
with American negotiators and specialists reflects the views, interests, 
and tasks of that part of the Party-dominated hierarchy with which 
he is associated. Thus a further caution is called for: Apparent discre- 
pancies between articles or speeches usually reflect different jour- 
nal/audience composition or interest, or particular domestic or interna- 
tional circumstances. Censorship exists. 
Most public initiatives, especially in sensitive spheres, are commis- 
sioned or encouraged (even Brezhnev has ghost-writers; even he must 
defer to a _ collective—the Politburo). The often  vituperative 
“‘dogmatist”’ Shelest is reported to have made the most accommodating 
speech to Czech leaders at Cierna Nad Tisou, in 1968; the ‘“‘hard- 
line’ Suslov has at times radiated moderation; the ‘‘moderate”’’ Kosygin 
has on occasion sounded like his early mentors.?* Labels are all- 
too-often misleading. A dogmatic approach to one issue can as often 
as not be contrasted with flexible approaches to other issues. 
Different attitudes, inclinations, preferences do of course exist. But 
they are seldom what they appear to be; superficial inferences must 
be abhorred—rarely indeed do they stand the test of time. And as 
concerns sometime hidden divergences, they are clearly such as can 
most often be submerged within the more general complementarity 
of interests. There is a basic compatibility of larger aims (at the 
top); a mutual familiarity with particular concerns (most current Party 
leaders served on local Military Councils, or similar bodies at one 
time or another; junior officers coordinate activities also with Party 
representatives); a practice of accommodation springing from 
analogous concerns (as on the lower-level councils); etc. Thus 
Grechko’s elevation to the Politburo reflected less increased military 
power, more the Party’s concern for a more symbolic representative- 
ness, and a return to the traditions of old; his influence will not 
reflect on military professionalism (for that, Chief of the General 
Staff Kulikov would have been better suited), it will reflect rather 
on his association with the Great Russian/Conservative Nationalist 
grouping at the establishment apex—and on his long-term rapport 
with Brezhnev and other Party leaders. 
SOVIET THEORY ON THE ROLE AND PLACE OF THE MILITARY 
This may serve as an appropriate summation. 
23C. G. Jacobsen, “Soviet Decision-Making During and Following the Czechoslovak Crisis,” 
N.U.P.I. Orientering, Oslo, 1969, and ‘‘Soviet Strategy . . . ,” op. cit. 
