276 
the ability to dispense with the need for an auxiliary naval supply 
fleet of consequence, can be politically useful. 
Finally, as in the case of the navy proper, there is the somewhat 
intangible but heavily stressed political fallout from demonstrations 
of efficiency and goodwill while in foreign ports. 
The centralized coordination of merchant fleets’ cargoes and move- 
ments (streamlined in 1971, with the introduction of a new “‘electronic 
computing center for the automatic control over the location of the 
seagoing fleet of the U.S.S.R.—in Moscow’’*?), entails a degree of 
optimization of costs and tasks such as to cause considerable envy 
in the hearts of most Western strategists. 
Such reaction is further justified when account is taken of the 
fact that the same automated system controls also port and repair 
facilities’ construction and operation. One illustrative fallout from this 
comprehensive coordination may be found, i.e., in the development 
of dual-purpose floating dock facilities. For the navy these have pro- 
vided a costly but politically useful alternative to total dependence 
on foreign bases; ** for the rapidly expanding civilian fleets, they have 
alleviated the problems of congested shore facilities—thus allowing 
the expansion of the latter to proceed at a more measured pace.*° 
THE FISHING AND OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH FLEETS 
The Fishing and Oceanographic Research Fleets provide analogous 
examples. Their research facilities, equipment and tasks are guided 
and monitored by the Military-Industrial Commission.**® Their sonar, 
electronic and other scientific equipment, essential for the efficient 
harvesting of ocean resources and the geological prospecting of ocean 
floor potentials, is equally vital in chartering Western fleet movements, 
submarine as well as surface and in monitoring more static Western 
naval defense arrangements.*’ Thus the “civilian” scientific means at 
the disposal of the Soviet Union clearly plays an inestimable, central 
role in efforts to monitor and penetrate systems such as SOSUS. 
(A principal U.S. strategic warning system, SOSUS is an exten- 
sive underwater sonar array system, linked to P-3 and other sur- 
face/air ASW vehicles. It covers the oceanic approach to the 
United States on both coasts, can localize within a circular area 
of 50 n.m. radius, and can resolve two submarines even when 
very close together. It can with high confidence give information 
' 53 “U §.S.R. 1973,” APN Handbook, pg. 217. 
54 Though it must be added that a global navy will still need at least some access to foreign facili- 
ties; see i.e., U.S. Naval Inst. Proceedings, March 1967. 
55 The Soviet Merchant Marine, Novosti, 1964, pg. 20. 
58 See Charts. 
57 Raoust, Revue de Defence National, Paris, April 1969 (‘‘—sonars utilized for the detection of 
fish may also no doubt be utilized to detect larger objects. It is not implausible to infer that Moscow 
knows the deployment of American Polaris submarines nearly as accurately as Washington.”’); 
NATO, Facts and Figures, pg. 80, Bruxelles, 1969, and Defence Policy, pg. 24, NATO Info. Service, 
1969 (‘‘—they carry comprehensive monitoring equipment and highly sophisticated electronic 
gear—"’); —see also Krasnaya Zvezda, July 27, 1969 (““—an important role in the securing of bases 
and combat operations is exercised by aid vessels of various size—"’). NOTE also testimony in N. P. 
Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry (Izdat. Pishevaya promyshlennost, Moscow, 1970), 
Chapter 6: the electronic equipment (radio, sonar, etc.) aboard trawlers rose four-fold between 1959 
and 1967, when it came to represent 10-30 percent of any ship’s total value. 
