277 
as to the general location of every submarine in the North Atlan- 
tic. Yet, there remain command and control deficiencies. A sub- 
marine can still ‘“‘hide’’ in shallow waters, at speeds under 10 
kt. And the task of finally localizing the submarine, on the part 
of mobile systems dispatched to the area identified by SOSUS, 
remains very considerable. Finally, there are of course obvious 
time problems—in the context e.g., of first/second strike 
scenarios. )°8 
Public Soviet discussions of the military role of the civilian fleets 
tend to be models of discretion. References tend to be both cursory 
and obtuse. This is especially true as concerns the intelligence-related 
potential of the fishing and oceanographic fleets. A number of Soviet 
authors have acknowledged the aid provided by these fleets to the 
navy proper (for a quote along these lines by Admiral Kasatonov, 
see footnote 57). But specificity has been a rare commodity. Western 
authors have generally had to rely on extrapolations from more 
catholic Soviet strategic pronouncements (always against the 
background of known or presumed technological parameters); and 
as concerns those with access to classified data, on correlations of 
such extrapolations with data gleaned from satellite and other intel- 
ligence sources. And a careful calibration of these different considera- 
tions can indeed produce composite pictures of considerable clarity, 
and accuracy. 
There are, fortunately, exceptions to the general dearth of specific 
references in Soviet strategic literature. And such exceptions do tend 
to corroborate deductive conclusions of the type described above. 
One might refer for example to Admiral Yakovlev’s book on “The 
Soviet Navy”: ‘Hydrographic ships are responsible for installing the 
required navigational equipment in a naval theatre (i.e. target loca- 
tion) and also for carrying out diverse other tasks—navigational-hydro- 
graphic support consists of a complex of measures aimed at equipping 
a theatre (of naval operation) with navigational devices for enabling 
aircraft and ships, as the need arises, to determine with great accuracy 
their precise location while at sea and located at great distances 
from their bases.” ®® In other words, the two main tasks are: (1) 
Target location, directed primarily at subsurface vehicles and installa- 
tions (satellites have long since become the prime conduit for surface 
intelligence), and utilizing both onboard equipment and deposited, 
anchored, devices; (2) Improving and securing command and control 
channels for the subsurface fleet, again through both onboard and 
ocean deposited equipment (and again with satellites now performing 
the prime surface functions, for surfaced submarines as well as for 
surface vessels per se). 
THE “STATE-OF-THE-ART” 
Thus there is little doubt about roles and functions. What uncer- 
tainty does exist relates to effectiveness, to the “‘state-of-the-art.”” The 
field of sonar developments is illustrative of the problem. Here, most 
58 See “Report” from Harvard University April 11, 1974 “PSIA Workshop on Anti-Submarine 
Warfare.” 
59 V_ D. Yakovlev, ‘‘Sovetskii Flot,” (The Soviet Navy), DOSAAF, Moscow 1969; JPRS, No. 692, 
1971, pgs. 27, 29 & 30 (with thanks to Prof. Leon Goure, who first drew this author’s attention to 
the book in question). 
