278 
observers would concur in the statement that the state of theoretical 
scientific knowledge on the subject in the U.S.S.R. is as advanced 
as that available in the West. And there is no question of continuing 
high priority and extensive Soviet efforts to translate theoretical 
knowledge into operational capability. But there remains some dispute 
as to the success of these efforts. Hence, there remains uncertainty 
as to the exact qualitative state of for example Soviet: Anti-Submarine 
Warfare capabilities, or e.g., Soviet ability to engage in schemes 
analogous to the recently much publicized (and only partially success- 
ful) C.I.A. attempt to localize and raise a sunken Soviet sub of dubious 
vintage.®! 
Analysts deprived of access to classified data can make no pretence 
to qualified judgement on these points. And neither, it seems, can 
those who do have access to such material (to judge from their 
inability to arrive at anything resembling a concensus). But it is fair 
to say that most commentators now tend to believe that the gap 
between Soviet and Western practical capabilities in these areas, if 
indeed a gap exists, is closing rather rapidly. And this conclusion 
would certainly appear to be buttressed by even the most cursory 
appreciation of current and projected Soviet designs for ‘“‘harvesting 
the ocean (and ocean floor) wealth.” These designs will be looked 
at below. Suffice it to note in this context that most of the methods 
and means now being employed, as well as those that are openly 
spoken of as being “‘in the pipeline,” have clear ‘“‘dual-purpose”’ poten- 
tial. 
OUTWARD DEPLOYMENT 
In view of the acknowledged military relevance of the Soviet civilian 
fleets, it should occasion no surprise that there has been a startling 
coincidence between their quantitative buildup and everexpanding 
deployment patterns, and the highsea emergence of the rapidly grow- 
ing Soviet Navy proper. From rudimentary activity in 1960 there 
emerged by 1970 what might, with dramatic flair and a certain licence, 
be called blanket coverage of the North Atlantic. And this has been 
followed (since the late 1960’s) by a similarly coincidental, parallel 
extension of significant military/civilian activities in oceans further 
afield.® 
POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPORT 
One should note that the strategic import of the civilian fleets 
is not restricted to the primary security functions outlined above. 
They also have more subtle or circumspect functions such as evident 
i.e., in their policy stance during the last Icelandic-U.K. ‘‘cod war” 
or even more pointedly in their cooperation with Portuguese authori- 
ties during the Portuguese sardine fishermen’s 1974 strike. Here, they 
quite blatantly acted as strike breakers, by providing sardines to the 
Portuguese canneries through the duration of the strike. Ideological 
6° See e.g., Proceedings of Dalhousie University’s 1974 ‘Maritime Seminar’’ (full transcript to be 
published by Praeger); note participants’ speculation re qualitatively different, novel, Soviet ap- 
proaches to ASW problems. 
§! See i.e., Times-Post story ‘C.I.A. Sub Salvage Rapped”’ and related accounts in “The Ottawa 
Citizen,’’ March 20, 1975. 
82 See i.e., Milan Kravanja’s presentation to Dalhousie University’s 1974 ‘‘Maritime Seminar.” 
