282 
lites will require high-frequency radiometers capable of operating in 
conditions of outer space, more sophisticated transmitting and receiv- 
ing devices, larger capacities for the recording devices carried, more 
sensitive sensors, the fuller processing of information aboard the satel- 
lite itself, and also the faster relaying of the information accumulated 
to those who need it—by 1975 most of our oceanographic observa- 
tions including measurement of water temperature, currents, shore 
erosion, ice movement, etc., will be effected wholly by artificial satel- 
lites.” 
Ocean floor bathymetric depth and relief charts have been drawn 
up (‘the Soviet Chart of the Pacific Ocean caused a sensation in 
the scientific world”), as have “top quality and precision magnetic 
charts,” current, salinity, oxidation tables, and the like—.*¢ . 
CAPSULE ASSESSMENT 
The aforementioned may serve to provide rationale for the astonish- 
ing growth of the Soviet civilian fleets: the merchant fleet now hovers 
near the 16 million tons mark, growing at the rate of one million 
tons a year;8? the equally dramatic growth of the fishing fleet was 
documented above;** the oceanographic research fleet was already 
by 1968 numerically ‘‘greater than the combined number of ships 
performing analogous missions for all the other nations of the 
world,” ®? and its growth has continued steadily ever since. 
Great efforts of men, money and technology have been and are 
invested. Considerable benefits have accrued. Expectations are star- 
tling (economically and perhaps also militarily). 
MILITARY-CIVILIAN COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
There are some “grey areas’’ however. Even if the overall return 
on the investments, economic as well as military, actual as well as 
potential, of the civilian fleets appears to be convincing, some 
questions nevertheless do present themselves. It is not that the military 
utility of these fleets is in doubt—although it must be acknowledged 
‘at the start that the worth of this contribution is inestimable (and 
in more ways than one: any Western attempt to assign a financial 
85 Osokin, op. cit. 
86 Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 February 1969. 
87 “U.S.S.R. 1973,” op. cit., or ie., T. Guzhenko’s “Under the Soviet Flag,’’ Novosti release 
206E474: New ships ‘include lifton, liftoff and rollon, rolloff ships able to carry 40, 200, 300 or 720 
foot containers, special ships for carrying timber, minerals and other cargoes in up to 20 ton 
packages, large refrigerator motorships, highspeed ships for regular oceanic lines, 150,000 ton tan- 
kers (with substantially larger versions now on the drawing boards)—etc.’’—Guzhenko’s survey goes 
on to delve into the highly significant, extensive coordination (cum integration) of Eastern European 
fleets with that of the U.S.S.R. He also comments on the expansion of ties with non-Socialist 
merchant fleet interests. 
88 Sysoev, op. cit., provides a graphic, corroborating statistic, in Table 24 of his Chapter 6: the pro- 
portion of the oceangoing fleet’s catch, of the total Soviet ocean and inland fisheries catch, rose from 
1.5 in 1913, through 26.9 in 1940 and 33.8 in 1950, to 79.9 in 1960 and 90.6 in 1968; the volume 
represented by these percentages were 0.016 million tons in 1913, 0.375 million tons in 1940, 0.592 
million tons in 1950, 2.831 million tons in 1960, 6.100 million tons in 1968. 
The same source also makes a number of noteworthy assertions re profitability: the Natal’ya 
Kovshova class trawler (with onboard canning, freezing and fishmeal processing equipment) is for ex- 
ample declared to average annual ship profits of 1.5 million rubles (in 1968), with investment 
recoupment periods of only 3 years. 
89 Raoust, op. cit.; or, in the words of Zenkevich: ‘‘More than 100 research ships—equipped with 
first-class requisites—cover the entire ocean from the North Pole down to the icebound Arctic.” 
