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powers, including the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, 
oppose territorial seas greater than 12 miles wide, no power would 
be more greatly harmed by such limits than the Soviet Union. The 
U.S.S.R, in a world of 200-mile territorial seas, would have no im- 
mediate access to the Atlantic. Territorial seas would link the waters 
of Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Britain leaving Soviet 
waters behind them. Soviet waters in the Baltic and the Black Sea 
are already behind the Danish straits and the Dardenelles. Further- 
more, the southerly routes from the Sea of Japan would also be 
closed. Only the northerly Siberian routes would be fully under Soviet 
control. This situation could limit the navigation of the Soviet Navy 
and merchant marine. It would surely restrict Soviet fishing and 
research activities. Although all the Western maritime powers would 
also be significantly hampered by 200-mile territorial seas, none would 
be so constrained as the U.S.S.R., making the Soviet Union’s position 
vis-a-vis Western maritime strength even weaker than before. 
INTERNATIONAL STRAITS 
If the demands of many Third World states for 200-mile territorial 
seas are successfully resisted and territorial limits are restrained to 
12 nautical miles, this will still mean an extension of the traditional 
sovereignty zone of 3 miles. There are some 121 international straits 
which are wider than 6 miles (and thus had a zone of high seas 
in them with 3-mile limits) but which are 24 miles wide or less 
(and thus would be enclosed by 6-mile limits.) These 121 straits 
include Gibraltar, Dover, and Malacca, and connect some of the most 
important bodies of water in the world. In the law of the sea debate, 
the Soviet Union has consistently insisted that there must be “free 
passage through straits used for international navigation.”’® Under 
traditional international law of the sea, passage through straits within 
territorial seas is governed by the rules of innocent passage, which 
not only prohibit underwater passage by submarines and overflight, 
but can be interpreted to give the coastal state the right to make 
a security determination concerning the passage of warships. Some 
states, including the U.S.S.R. (especially in the days before it was 
a maritime power), have insisted that state must give prior notice 
before sending warships through straits under innocent passage 
regimes. The U.S.S.R., at least since 1967, has resisted the extension 
of innocent passage rules, claiming that this would leave important 
straits too much under the control of a small group of states, a 
situation “‘prejudicial not only to international navigation, but also 
to the entire international community.” '° 
To replace the innocent passage rules, the Soviet Union along with 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and the Ukraine, 
presented ‘‘Draft Articles on Straits used for International Navigation” 
to the 1974 Caracas meeting of the Law of the Sea Conference. 
The most important provision is the first: 
In straits used for international navigation between one part 
of the high seas and another part of the high seas, all ships 
in transit shall enjoy the equal freedom of navigation for the 
purpose of transit passage through such straits." 
~ ® A/C.A/PV.1777, at 32 (1970). 
” A/AC.138/SR.83, at 70-73 (1972). 
™ A/CONF.62/C.2/L.11 (1974). 
