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standard Soviet practice), help in processing raw materials, etc.'° 
Given the circumstances, Soviet relations with Third World raw 
material producers cannot be much more than ambivalent. 
There remains the question of the vulnerability of the sealanes 
linking developed states with overseas raw material and energy 
sources. 
Admiral Zumwalt has pointed out that ‘69 of our 72 critical raw 
materials come to us by sea”’ and that, by 1980, “‘we will be requiring 
about 50 percent of our oil from overseas.”” Drew Middleton has 
commented that “‘the vulnerability of such seaborne supplies has in- 
creased with the development in the Russian fleet of nuclear-powered 
submarines, armed with torpedoes and missiles, and cruisers and 
destroyers equipped with missiles with ranges of 500 miles and more. 
This threat to American maritime traffic . . . has led to new areas 
of naval construction.”’ Among these are 3 Nimitz class attack carriers, 
“floating, sovereign airfields . . . whose purpose . .. is to protect 
the sealanes from air attack,” as well as ‘“‘sea control ships’ for 
A.S.W., with helicopters and V/STOL aircraft, and 250 new escorts, 
including DLGN nuclear-powered frigates. ‘‘Congressional criticism of 
the program has cooled considerably in the wake of the energy crisis 
and a new national realization of national dependence on overseas 
supplies ... the principal threat ...to American merchantmen 
remain the Russian submarines.” 
This appraisal is very largely borne out by the almost obsessive 
preoccupation with the potential of naval warfare against maritime 
arteries, particularly submarine warfare, revealed in Admiral Gorsh- 
kov’s definitive series of articles. The opening lines of the very first 
article deal with the sea as a conveyor belt of natural resources: 
“For many centuries the ocean expanses have . . . been con- 
venient means of communication between continents and between 
the suppliers of products vitally essential to mankind. . . . The 
potential military might of one state . . . built up in accordance 
with its economic capabilities and political orientation, permitted 
it to conduct a policy advantageous to itself, to the detriment 
of other states.... Among the elements .. . affecting the 
development of ... the armed forces of states, are the seas 
and oceans (which constitute the major pathway) of commerce, 
of reliable routes of communication, . . . and of the fishing and 
maritime industries. . . . It is impossible not to note how man’s 
ability to comprehend the ocean and to use it for his own needs 
directly affects the growth of the political prestige of the country 
and its economic and military might. . . . The seas and oceans 
serve as an inexhaustible source of diverse food resources, indus- 
trial raw materials, and energy. The most important and economi- 
cally most advantageous routes of communications between coun- 
tries, through which trade .. . [is] carried out, pass through 
the seas and oceans. All of this determines the special role of 
the seas and oceans in the economy of states. [and leads to] 
the building up in the maritime countries of many areas of indus- 
try and an economy dependent on the sea. . . . Maritime states 
10 See Jean Riolott, Ibid, (Soviet) Radio Peace and Progress in English to Asia, Apr. 8, 1974. 
™ Drew Middleton in The New York Times, May 27, 1974. 
