300 
having great economic capabilities have widely used their naval 
forces in peacetime to put pressure ontheir enemies, as a type 
of military demonstration, as threats of interrupting sea communi- 
cations, and as a hindrance to ocean commerce.”’ !” 
Applying his theories to one particularly vital naval communications 
area, where disruption cannot but have a direct bearing on the supply 
of energy, Admiral Gorshkov continues: 
“Our Fleet has shown the whole world that the Mediterranean 
Sea is not anyone’s preserve or a closed lake and that Russia 
is a Mediterranean power. The location of its forces in these 
waters is based ...on... the age-old need for the Russian 
Fleet to stay there. Today . . . this region has assumed especially 
important significance. ... It is natural that ... the Soviet 
Union is forced to . . . implement its indisputable and legal right 
to have warships in the Mediterranean Sea. . . . And if our ene- 
mies more and more often look at the Soviet Navy and see 
in it... a hindrance ... this means that it is carrying out 
the mission assigned to it. The Western .. . press, and state 
and military figures . . . write and say that the ‘political influence 
of the Russians in this strategically important sea is directly pro- 
portional to the numerical strength of their fleet’.’’ * 
In connection with the vital role, and the vulnerability, of sea com- 
munications in World War I, Admiral Gorshkov stresses: 
“The erosion of the military-economic resources ... in the 
belligerent countries forced their governments to seek avenues 
to accelerate the end of the war. In this connection, the econo- 
mies of Great Britain and France, being supplied by sea with 
the resources of almost the entire world, were in a more satisfac- 
tory condition, and this made it possible for them to wage a 
prolonged war and count on success. Germany, on the other 
hand, due to the naval blockade felt the sharp deficiency in 
raw materials and foodstuffs, and therefore a prolonged war 
promised defeat for her. . . . Under these -conditions Ger- 
many ... Say . . . a way out in unrestricted submarine operations 
against the sea communications of Great Britain. . . . The losses 
of the enemy’s (sic:) merchant fleet grew continuously. Despite 
the efforts undertaken by the British the production of merchant 
fleet tonnage was only about 10 percent of the losses. As a 
result of the unrestricted submarine warfare . . . Great Britain 
herself seemed to be on the verge of economic catastrophe. Vast 
ASW forces of the Entente ... were thrown into the battle 
against the submarines. . . . However, despite this, the merchant 
fleet’s losses continued to be high. Only in the latter period of 
the war did the effectiveness of the submarines drop, primarily 
due to the fact that the German command, after having assigned 
the prosecution of the main effort to them, failed to divert other 
naval forces to support their operations (which was particularly 
necessary in connection with the growth of the ASW forces of 
the Entente . . .). In response ... the Germans merely in- 
troduced new submarines into service. However their introduction 
turned out to be too little too late (due to the absence of support 
2 Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, “‘Navies in War and in Peace,’’ Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1972. 
‘3 Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, ‘“‘Navies in War and in Peace,’’ Morskoy Sbornik, No. 3, 1972. 
