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operations. Therefore the question of the ratio of submarine to 
antisubmarine forces is of great interest even under present-day 
conditions, since if A.S.W. forces which were so numerous and 
technically up-to-date (for that time), possessing a vast superiori- 
ty, turned out to be capable only of partially limiting the opera- 
tions of diesel submarines, then what must this superiority be 
today to counter nuclear-powered submarines, whose [superior] 
combat capabilities cannot be compared with the capabilities of 
World War II era submarines. 
Although the A.S.W. forces pressed the submarines con- 
siderably, they were unable to discredit them and knock them 
out. . . . The submarines turned out to be very much alive: of 
all the armed forces of . . . Germany only they presented a seri- 
ous threat to British and U.S. shipping right up to the very last 
day of the war. ... From all that has been said it is clear 
that submarines in World War II were, and even more so under 
modern conditions are the main means of combating the enemy’s 
shipping . . . [On the other hand, Germany in World War II, 
unlike Britain and unlike Germany herself in World War I, was 
not bothered unduly by naval blockade, because the Germans] 
succeeded in seizing and putting at the service of their own milita- 
ry machine the economies and the vast natural resources of almost 
all of the . . . European countries. *® 
[Admiral Gorshkov stresses that German submarines during 
World War II could have achieved much more, but for the fact] 
that the submarines did not receive support from the other forces, 
and above all from the air force, which would have been able 
both to carry out reconnaissance for the submarines and destroy 
A.S.W. forces, as well as to operate against the enemy’s economy 
by attacking his ports and targets in the shipbuilding industry, 
not to mention attacks against ships at sea. These reasons con- 
siderably reduced the effectiveness of German submarine employ- 
ment in cutting off the enemy’s shipping in the Atlantic. ... An 
analysis of the struggle for Atlantic and Pacific communica- 
tions . . . permits the conclusion that the interruption of sea shipping 
to a great degree weakened the economies of the belligerents and had 
a definite influence on the course of the military operations. . . . On 
the eve of World War II the opinion existed . . . that submarines 
were a weapon of the weak. The course of the war at sea totally 
refuted this. Moreover, submarines became the most important means 
of combat at sea.”’ 17 5 
Admiral Gorshkov leaves no doubt that the naval capabilities, which 
he regards as being so effective in war, have their political and 
psychological utility in nonwar situations as well: 
“The Navy possesses the capability vividly to demonstrate the 
economic and military power of a country beyond its borders 
during peacetime. This quality is normally used by the political 
leadership . . . to show their readiness for decisive actions, to 
deter or suppress the intentions of potential enemies, as well 
16 The implication is obvious: In case of hostilities today, the U.S.S.R., like Germany in World War 
II, would be able to seize most of Europe—and, perhaps, the Middle East—thus becoming far less 
vulnerable to an interdiction of sealanes. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, with its huge sub- 
marine force, could wage effective warfare against Western sea communications. 
17 Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, ‘‘Navies in War and in Peace,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 11, 1972. _ 
