303 
as to support ‘friendly states’. It should be noted that the arsenal 
of instruments of such demonstrations is constantly being ex- 
panded . . . aimed at a clearly evident goal: to surprise probable 
enemies with the perfection of equipment being exhibited, to 
affect their morale, to intimidate them right up to the outbreak 
of war, and to suggest to them in advance the hopelessness of 
fighting. . . . Today’s combatants carry not only guns, but also 
nuclear-missile weaponry and aircraft, whose operating ranges can 
cover the entire territory of a foreign state. Therefore the capabil- 
ity of navies to appear suddenly close to the shores of different 
countries and immediately proceed to carry out their assigned 
missions . . . [is] an important weapon of diplomacy and policy 
in peacetime, which in many cases has permitted the achievement 
of political goals without resorting to military operations by only 
threatening to initiate them. . . . The Soviet Armed Forces, in- 
cluding also the navy, have emerged as one of the instruments 
of Soviet policy. . . . The creation at the will of the party of 
a new Soviet Navy and its emergence onto the ocean expanses 
have fundamentally altered the relative strength of forces. . . . The 
former inaccessibility of the continents, which permitted them to 
count on impunity ...in the past, has now become ancient 
history.”’ 1° 
“The United States having created a situation for the Socialist 
countries in which they are surrounded from the direction of 
the sea, [has] not experienced a similar danger. Could the Soviet 
Union reconcile itself to such a situation? Could it agree to an 
age-long domination of the seas and oceans by the traditional 
Western sea powers. . . ? Of course not! . .. Just the presence 
of our navy imposes on [the adversary] the need to solve those 
same problems himself which he thought he was creating for 
[us]. . . . The need to build a powerful ocean-going navy . . . was 
backed up and is being backed up by the vast capabilities of the 
military economic potential of the Soviet state and by the achieve- 
ment of our science and technology. In speaking of the military 
economic potential of our country, it should be noted that it possesses 
vast, practically inexhaustible energy, raw material, and fuel 
resources. . . . In giving priority to the development of submarine 
forces .. . the Navy is . . . acquiring the capability . ... of par- 
ticipating in the crushing of an enemy’s military economic 
potential .. .”?9 
It may be questioned why, under conditions of thermonuclear war- 
fare, Soviet leaders should think that there would be enough time 
left for the cutting of sealanes and the interdicting of supplies of 
energy and natural resources to make a significant difference. An 
authoritative Soviet handbook on military thought, of which a special 
English-language edition was recently issued in Moscow, answers this 
point very clearly: 
‘““. . at the very beginning of the war, after the first nuclear 
missle exchange, a sharp and radical change may set in in the 
relation of the combatants’ economic potentials. Does all this 
mean that the economy, which plays a decisive role during the 
18 Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, ‘“‘Navies in War and in Peace,’’ Morskoy Sbornik, No. 12, 1972. 
19 Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, “‘Navies in War and in Peace,’ Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, February 1973. 
