315 
The Japanese emphasis is on the San Francisco Treaty, which they 
claim does not confer sovereignty to a specific nation, least of all 
to the Soviet Union, who was not a signatory.'* Article 2, Paragraph 
C of the San Francisco Treaty states: 
Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the Kurile Islands 
and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it 
over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the 
Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. 
The Soviet position reflects concern over the possible effects any 
territorial concession would exert upon the acrimonious and long- 
standing Sino-Soviet border dispute. In rebuttal, the Japanese position 
contends that Japanese historical sovereignty over the islands and 
subjective interpretations of the cited international agreements justify 
its claim, or at least, do not support the Soviet claim. 
Originally, the Joint Declaration of 1956 alluded to the possibility 
of the Soviet transfer of the Habomais and Shikotan, provided that 
a peace treaty was concluded. However, Japan has consistently insisted 
upon a reverse sequence of events. To the Japanese, the return of 
the islands must precede the conclusion of a peace treaty, and this 
return must include all four islands. In addition to subsequent debates 
over the issue, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 and the ex-. 
istence of foreign troops on Japanese soil furnished the Soviet Union 
with a convenient excuse to deny return of the islands. In view of 
the security risks perceived by the U.S.S.R., Japanese abrogation of 
the treaty was set forth as a prerequisite for return of the two islands. 
During the 1960’s, the American military presence in Japan and con- 
trol over Okinawa facilitated the Soviet refusal to negotiate any terri- 
torial concession. 
Throughout the negotiations, the Soviet Union has sought reasons 
to close the issue and thereby maintain control over the disputed 
islands in view of their strategic and economic value. In addition 
to their salmon and crab fisheries value, these islands serve Soviet 
strategic interests by providing both submarine bases for Pacific opera- 
tions and control over the Sea of Okhotsk by roughly completing 
the chain from Kamchatka to Sakhalin. However, the Japanese govern- 
ment has steadfastly refused to accept the Soviet position. A com- 
promise on the territorial issue based upon the 1956 original proposi- 
tion is theoretically possible depending upon its priority among other 
bargaining chips in these bilateral negotiations. However, the Soviet 
Government asserts that the territorial issue has long been settled 
by international agreement despite Japanese claims to the contrary. 
Since 1972, the conclusion of a peace treaty has received a good 
deal of attention in bilateral discussions at the ministerial level. While 
the Japanese consider the two issues as inextricably connected, the 
Soviets attempt to separate the issue of a peace treaty from that 
of the disputed territory during the negotiations. Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko’s visit to Tokyo in January, 1972 indicated 
Soviet willingness to improve bilateral relations. At the end of this 
visit, it was announced that negotiations on a peace treaty would 
begin soon. 
13 Kim, Young C. ‘‘Japanese-Soviet Relations: Interaction of Politics, Economics and National 
Security.”” Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974. (The Washington Paper; v. 21) (A Sage Policy 
Paper) p. 19, 21. 
