THE SPITZBERGEN CONTROVERSY: A CASE STUDY 
(By Carl Jacobsen ') 
- GEOPOLITICAL SENSITIVITIES, AND CONSEQUENT SECURITY 
PREROGATIVES 
Sovereignty over the Svalbard/Spitzbergen archipelago has long been 
a subject of extreme concern and sensitivity to Soviet security organs. 
Towards the end of the Second World War, in a discussion with 
then Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, Molotov presented a 
succinct synopsis of Russian anxieties. His words serve to indicate 
the enduring character of Moscow’s concern. They followed Norway’s 
refusal to a Soviet demand that she give up her suzerainty over Sval- 
bard and Bear Island (the former was to be put under a joint Norwe- 
gian-Soviet administration which was to act “as a condominium”, the 
latter was to be transferred outright), and were frank and to the point: 
ea the. Dardanelles)... . Nere, we ater locked jin : 
Oresund . . . here we are locked in. Only in the North is there 
an opening, but this war has shown that the supply line to 
Northern Russia can be cut or interfered with. This shall not 
be repeated in the future. We have invested much in this part 
of the Soviet Union, and it is so important for the entire Union’s 
existence that We shall in future ensure that Northern Russia 
is permitted to live in security and peace’’.” 
Molotov acknowledged that the Norwegians were friendly neighbors, 
but persisted: “‘shall we settle this in a friendly manner, or shall 
there be a dispute?’’?? Admiral Golovko summed up: ‘“‘Without the 
Kola inlet the Northern fleet cannot exist . . . the Kola inlet is neces- 
sary to the state.’’* 
The dynamic post-war expansion of Kola base facilities and the 
introduction and buildup of strategic naval forces underlined the sig- 
nificance of the area. The basis for the abiding Soviet concern is 
clearly to be found in the field of security. Her acute sensitivity 
reflects strategic realities. Defense activation procedures entail certain 
time requirements vis a vis incoming strikes; *'while offensive prospects 
must be secured against such countermeasures as might jeopardize 
their employment (one thinks i.e. of the at present legally defunct 
but nevertheless technologically attractive potential of Polaris/Poseidon 
based BMD’s proximate enough to intercept during ICBMs’ vulnerable 
ascent phase). Moscow could not accept active hostile utilization 
of adjacent lands and water.’ 
‘The author is a Professor of International Relations at Carlton University, Canada. 
* V. Molotov, as quoted by Trygve Lie in ‘‘Hjemover,” Tiden Norsk Forlag, Oslo, 1958. 
3 Ibid. 
* A. Golovko, ‘“‘With the Red Fleet. The War Memoirs of Admiral Golovko,” Pitman, London, p- 
40, (first published by Voenizdat, Moscow, 1960). 
° See e.g. ‘International Affairs,” Moscow, No. 12, 1969. 
_° For elaboration see C. G. Jacobsen, “‘Soviet Strategy-Soviet Foreign Policy,’ Ch. 6, The Univer- 
sity Press, Glasgow, 2nd ed. 1974 upon which this section is based. 
7 Ibid., and see footnote 5. 
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