326 
to the fact that both articles cover ‘fishing and maritime activities’. 
Territorial waters is not mentioned in the Svalbard treaty’s articles 
7, 8, which deal specifically with ““Ownership” and ‘‘Mining.” 
“It follows that the Norwegian Continental Shelf is clearly not 
affected by the Svalbard Treaty’s decisions. This interpretation 
is reinforced by other Treaty clauses. 
“Thus article 7 decrees that as regards the acquisition and 
exploitation of ownership rights, herein included mining rights, 
Norway commits herself to accord equal treatment to Treaty part- 
ners’ subjects, but only for those areas mentioned in the Treaty’s - 
article 1. The Treaty’s article 1 is explicitly limited to the Svalbard 
archipelago’s land areas, that is to islands and large and small 
skerries. The equal rights clause of article 7 ought therefore in 
principle not even to apply to territorial waters. 
“Article 8 provides further support for this interpretation in 
that this article commits Norway to establish mining regulations 
for areas mentioned in article 1, which again in principle means 
the land areas of Svalbard. 
‘“*. . . Paragraph 1 of the mining regulations (enacted in August 
of 1925) refers only to islands and large and small skerries. Para- 
graph 9 contains clauses regarding claim demarcations which 
demonstrate that they focus on land areas. Claims must be de- . 
marcated with markers in hard rock or through other lasting 
means... in the field. . .* 
“(Anyway) ... the continental shelf in the area off 
Troms/Finmark and Svalbard—constitutes a natural extension of 
the land masses of the Norwegian mainland. Under Norwegian 
and international law, based on the exploitation criteria, Norway 
therefore has sovereign rights over these areas, regardless of the 
Svalbard Treaty.*4 
Norway’s position was thus to preempt speculation, by foreclosing 
debate on the continental shelf, and by presenting such a strict defini- 
tion of Svalbard Treaty clauses as would also reserve onto herself 
petroleum and mineral extraction rights in Svalbard territorial waters. © 
However, what appeared to be a backup bargaining position as regards 
the territorial waters issue was noted at the same time. It deserves 
quoting as a weather vane of ultimate Norwegian negotiating flexibil- 
ity; as reflecting the more conciliatory range of Oslo’s perception 
of possible negotiating parameters: 
‘“‘Article 2 of the Treaty mentions measures for protecting the 
natural environment of the island group . . . Under the exercise 
of their legislative and administrative authority, the Norwegian 
authorities are obligated to undertake the balancing involved 
here. 
Initial Soviet reaction to all three stances was cool.® As a growing 
maritime power she was loathe to countenance the freedom of the 
seas implications of vague extensions of ocean states’ jurisdiction; 
as an established actor on the Svalbard scene she was loath to accept 
33 Norwegian Ministry of Industry's ‘‘Oversikt over Oljepolitiske Spoersmaal”’, 1971, op. cit. 
34 Norwegian Ministry of Finance’s ‘“‘Parliamentary Report No. 25 (1973-74)”, op. cit. 
35 Ibid. One might note that this “‘fall-back position” is receiving somewhat more prominent treat- | 
ment in recent Norwegian government documents; see i.e. ““Report No. 39," op. cit. (in this, the 
“hard-line”’ position is implicit in certain sections, but never made explicit). 
36 Norwegian Foreign Ministry sources. 
