327 
regulations of possible restricting import. Finally, she may have been 
loathe to make concessions regarding Svalbard proper at a time of 
ongoing negotiations to delineate the boundary between Norwegian 
and Soviet continental shelves. 
| SVALBARD AS A FOCUS FOR LAW OF THE SEA AND SECTOR PRINCIPLE 
DELIBERATIONS 
Soviet opposition to Norway’s assertion of continental shelf 
‘sovereignty jarred with her own traditional espousal of the sector 
principle, and its corollary of Soviet suzerainty over that part of the 
Arctic Ocean bounded by the longitudinal extremities of the Union’s 
Northern territories (with an eastward indentation between the Sval- 
bard archipelago’s southern and northern latitudinal limits, drawn 
along the longitudinal median between Svalbard and Franz Josef’s 
land).?” The Soviet stance conformed to her general antipathy towards 
the early 1970’s somewhat anarchic proliferation of unilaterally 
promulgated coastal states’ assertions of ocean sovereignty claims. 
And it may as previously indicated be seen to reflect the natural 
concerns of free passage of what had become one of the world’s 
major maritime powers. 
_ But the Soviet position softened appreciably during the first half 
of the 1970’s. In part this was no doubt due to her realization that 
the mushrooming trend to extend coastal states’ ocean and ocean 
floor exploitation rights could be seen to complement and indirectly 
sanctify her view of the sector principle. One might point to the 
fact that the southern reaches of the Arctic Ocean, the Barents, Kara, 
Laptev, and East Siberian Seas, are extraordinarily shallow; the ocean 
floors here involved are all within relatively easily exploitable depths.*® 
Another motive for Soviet flexibility might be inferred from a 
presumed reluctance to jeopardize her self-espoused role as protector 
of third world interests; most of the more assertive coastal right’s 
nations were counted among those otherwise less privileged. 
There emerged a careful differentiation of the rights of free passage 
and the rights of exploitation. As regards the former, Moscow’s firmly 
stated complementarity of interests with Washington, London, and 
other maritime powers appeared likely to ensure the perpetuation 
of traditional concepts. As regards the rights of exploitation, evolving 
Soviet attitudes tended more and more to complement the aspirations 
of third world nations. The U.S.S.R. insisted on a 12-mile limit to 
territorial waters, but proceeded to suggest that continental shelf rights 
extend to whichever was greater, the 500 meter isobath or 100 nauti- 
cal miles beyond the baselines from which territorial seas were mea- 
sured.3? Moscow’s position was moving towards acceptance of the 
(1971) tenet that: 
“In view of the practice chosen by a number of Latin American 
states and other developing nations, it is. . . politically unrealistic 
to believe that a distance of less than 200 nautical miles off 
shore would be acceptable as a criterium of international law. 
37 Traditional Soviet views on the sector principle, as well as the rather unique Soviet definitions of 
“historic bays’’, may be found i.e. in Z. Meshera, ‘‘Morskoe Pravo: Pravovoi Rezhim Morskikh 
Putei” (“Maritime Law: Legal Regime of Maritime Routes’), Moscow, 1959. 
nee abs The Times Atlas, London 1972, or any of the more detailed bathymetric charts currently 
39 Janis and Daniel, ‘““The U.S.S.R.: Ocean Use and Ocean Law”’, Occasional Paper No. 21, Law of 
the Sea Institute, U.R.I., May 1974. 
