328 
The alternative depth criterium might be suggested to be 500 
or 1,000 meters.’’4° 
By 1975, 4 years, two relatively unsuccessful Law of the Sea Con- 
ferences (Caracas and Geneva), and a further proliferation of uni- 
lateral claims later, it appeared clear that nothing less than the outer 
limits suggested in the above quote would prove acceptable. Law 
of the Sea consensus was moving towards 200 n. miles and/or 1,000 
meter isobath coastal states’ reserve exploitation zones;*! with at least 
some kind of “common heritage of mankind” stipulation to cover 
exploitation of unaffected ocean areas. 
The developments promised considerable benefice to Moscow. Her 
fleet movements, naval and civilian, would remain basically unfettered. 
On the other hand, as regards ocean floor exploitation, she secured 
for herself a disproportionately vast expanse of geologically highly 
promising real estate.4*2 And it was surely not lost on her that the 
trend would, conversely, serve to restrict the less fortunately endowed 
U.S. access to noncontiguous shelf riches. By restricting the ““common 
heritage of mankind” acreage to more dramatic depths she might 
furthermore effectively retard the United States’ ability to draw max- 
imum benefit from residual American deep-sea mining technological 
superiority, while she herself pursued her currently highly impressive 
priority research efforts.4*7 As regards nonmining exploitation of deep 
sea resources, the U.S.S.R. was of course already in a highly favorable 
position, as a result of the dramatic quantitative and qualitative expan- 
sion of her fishing fleets that she had effected through the previous 
decade. 
But while international law on ocean floor exploitation rights was 
tending both to buttress Soviet Northern policy, and to reserve for 
Norway the sensitive depths between her northern counties and Sval- 
bard, there remained the uncertainties of continuing delimitation dif- 
ferences. There remained substantial discrepancies between the 
delimitation suggested by the Soviet-championed sector principle, and 
that suggested by the Norwegian-adhered-to 1958 Geneva Convention 
clause on the median line principle.* 
Preliminary negotiations were initiated in 1970, a fact which in 
itself could be taken to refiect a degree of flexibility on the part 
of Moscow. At least the question was not foreclosed. Settlement had 
still not been achieved by 1975. But negotiations were proceeding, 
and Norwegian sources were acknowledging a new Soviet willingness 
to at least concede Norway’s basic position on the northern shelf 
49 Translated from Norwegian Ministry of Industry’s ‘““Oversikt over Oljepolitiske Spoersmaal”, op. 
cit.; and note the subsequent joint Norwegian-Australian initiative to the Caracas Law of the Sea 
Conference. 
41 It is illustrative to contrast the restrictive U.S. initiative to the Aug. 1970 Geneva Ocean Floor - 
Committee session with current (1975) Congressional initiatives. 
#2 Note above comments on the geologically similar Northern Norwegian continental shelf, 
(footnote 20); see also Ocean Oil Weekly Report, Vol. 9 No. 10, Dec. 1974; and i.e. Vinogradov’s 
““Ocean in the Year 2000”, Novosti 201H4922/B (from Vodni Transport). 
43 See quotes in Chapter 2 of C.G. Jacobsen, Notes on Military-Civilian Integration in the U.S.S.R.: 
A Case Study: The “Civilian” Fleets, as yet unpublished report commissioned by Queen’s University 
Dept. of Political Studies, April 1975. 
“Ibid. 
45 See i.e. Arvid Pardo’s treatment, in Foreign Affairs, October 1968. 
Note: The difference between the “‘med line’’ which the U.N. Convention prescribes, for situations 
not affected by ‘‘special conditions” favouring alternate principles and the ‘sector principle”’ long es- 
poused by Moscow, and now portrayed as such a “special condition” common law equivalent, 
amounts to 155,000 square kilometers. 
