329 
issue (as a practical corollary of the above treated evolving Soviet 
position on the larger Law of the Sea issue), as well as Norway’s 
interpretation of the import of the Svalbard Treaty.*® 
The degree of Soviet flexibility thus evinced stems, as previously’ 
indicated, from a number of considerations. First and foremost among | 
these is that of security. With the spectre of a multinational oil and, 
gas scramble in the area being well nigh intolerable from a security 
viewpoint, Moscow was clearly finding it preferable to concede to 
and support Norwegian claims. The promised perpetuation and exten- 
sion of the now traditional de facto military quasi-neutrality of 
Denmark, was far preferable to any conceived alternative. And it: 
was surely the paramount, crucial nature of this concern which in-' 
duced also Soviet flexibility on the delimitation issue; —just as the 
converse Norwegian willingness to compromise as evinced through! 
her presence at the negotiating table, surely demonstrated Norwegian | 
recognition of the fact that too great an exacerbation of tensions 
in the area could prove dangerously counterproductive. Moscow could 
find relative comfort in the low risk promise of Norwegian control 
as presently envisaged.*” If such a solution proved infeasable, however, 
then geo-political realities would clearly dictate consideration of higher 
risk alternatives. ; 
But there is also one other factor that might be presumed to have’! 
been present in Soviet calculations. As demonstrated by the 1975. 
Norwegian development of the gigantic, revolutionary concrete drilling : 
platform ““Condeep”, Norway has emerged in the forefront of world! 
ocean drilling technology. She has become an alternative source of 
the most advanced deep sea oil and gas extractions technology. It: 
is not too farfetched to envisage a negotiated control delimitation | 
agreement whereby at least some further Soviet concessions were 
forthcoming in return for access to that technology.*® Or else, in 
lieu of an exact demarcation settlement, one might perhaps envisage 
Moscow-conceded Norwegian extraction rights throughout the area 
in dispute, in return for Soviet access either to technology or to. 
profits. 
Yet, finally, one must return to the point that the fulcrum for 
all Soviet policy initiatives in the area lies in the Kola base complexes; 
-and that the character of these initiatives are determined by the 
| geopolitical realities and constraints of the Kola Peninsula. Geopoliti- 
cal facts dictated the development of Kola as the most vital core 
area of expanding Soviet Naval and Civilian Fleets. Geopolitical facts 
dictated these fleets’ dependence on unimpeded passage through the 
Norway-Bear Island gap.*® 
46 This information was conveyed by Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials to interested allied 
parties in the spring and summer of 1975. 
47 Norway has designated that her State Petroleum Directorate be “responsible, together with 
Statoil (the State Oil Co.), for ALL activities connected with petroleum operations on the shelf, in- 
cluding those in the Svalbard area” (from Report No. 39, op. cit.; this author’s explanatory bracket, 
and emphasis). As of early 1976 she continues to limit drilling to areas south of 62 degrees N., and 
insists that even in these more southerly reaches production must be curbed, and carefully controlled 
(See i.e. The New York Times, Sept. 28, 1975). 
48 Note references to Scientific-technical co-operation in i.e. Pravda, Dec. 8, 1971, op. cit., and 
“Report No. 39 (1974-75)”’, op. cit., esp. Chapter VII, Sections 3 and 4. 
“9 C. G. Jacobsen, “‘Soviet Strategy . . ."’, Ch. 6, op. cit. 
The Sept. 11, 1975 Tass announcement (see Pravda, Sept. 12) that missile tests would be con- 
ducted in the area, within a radius of 40 nautical miles from a center point at 73 degrees N. 35 
degrees E, may be seen as a rather unambiguous signal of abiding Soviet concern and determination. 
The test range overlapped with demarcation-disputed territory (see also footnote 44). 
