330 
Moscow could no more tolerate hostile control over that gap than 
she could tolerate hostile control over the mountain ranges of Western 
Czechoslovakia (east of which the plains stretch flat, if marshy to 
Moscow). If she considered Svalbard sensitive enough to warrant 
thoughts of intervention in November of 1944, then there can be 
no doubt that its much increased strategic value today would be 
seen to justify and indeed demand intervention in the event of its 
future hostile utilization.*° 
5° If anything, the evolution towards home water basing of SSBNs, which the introduction of the 
long range SS-N-8 missiles appear to augur, would further increase the crucial sensitivity of the area 
in the eyes of Soviet planners. 
See also Jan Ingebrigtsen’s ‘‘En studie av Norskehavets Strategiske Betydning som funksjon av Sov- 
jetunionens Nordflaates Operasjoner’’, NUPI Rapport, N.U.P.I., Oslo, August 1975. 
