424 
St. Pierre and Miquelon, French islands off the Newfoundland coast 
of Canada, have been developing their port facilities in recent years 
in order to serve as a transshipment base for European fishing fleets 
operating in the Northwest Atlantic. New wharves have been added, 
as well as a cold storage plant equipped to freeze and store all kinds 
of fishery products. As an inducement to foreign fleets, the plant 
has been granted ‘‘duty free” status which means that no duty will 
be charged on goods brought in for freezing and/or storage and later 
shipped out of the island. The facilities at St. Pierre, however, offer 
comparatively little competition to the well-developed Canadian ports 
of St. John’s (Newfoundland) and Halifax. The size of the harbor 
at St. Pierre limits the number of foreign vessels that can be serviced 
there. St. Pierre and Miquelon, however, did serve as nearby alterna- 
tive ports for Soviet trawlers when the Canadian Government closed 
its Atlantic ports in August, 1975. This port closure did not last 
long. By late September 1975, Soviet and Canadian fishery delegations 
had reached an agreement and the ports were reopened. At best, 
St. Pierre and Miquelon can serve as an auxiliary to, but not replace- 
ment for, the traditional fishing ports of the Canadian Atlantic coast. 
While a specialized fishing base, like the ones in Havana or on 
the Spanish Canaries, is of exceptional significance for the smooth 
operations of farflung Soviet fleets, it must not be forgotten that 
the Soviet fishing and fishery support vessels can, and do, call in 
almost any port in the world to obtain water, fuel, and other supplies. 
The only consistent exception in allowing unlimited port calls to 
Soviet fishery vessels is the United States. When giant armadas 
of these vessels first appeared off U.S. coasts in the early 1960’s 
to fish the rich resources of its Continental Shelf, the U.S. Government 
maintained a ‘“‘no-port-calls”’ policy (except, of course, in emergencies 
or for humaritarian reasons). By the late 1960’s, the United States 
had negotiated a bilateral agreement on Soviet fishing in the Mid- 
Atlantic Bight (from Rhode Island to Cape Hatteras) and opened 
four of its Atlantic ports to a few Soviet vessels. This was in exchange 
for Soviet acceptance of certain limitations on their fishing which 
were deemed essential for the conservation of fishery resources or 
for the protection of U.S. coastal fishermen. Today, the Soviet vessels 
may call at the ports of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Bal- 
timore, but only in severely limited numbers (4 a month). 
INVESTMENTS IN THE FISHERY FLEET 
During the last 30 years, the Soviet Union has invested an estimated 
8.4 billion rubles '? in new additions to its fishing and support fleets. 
Prior to World War II, such investments were minimal in accordance 
with Stalin’s view of the U.S.S.R. as a land power and his policy 
of developing heavy industry rather than the output of consumer 
products. 
‘8 This is no exaggeration. In 1961, when the Soviets first began fishing off New England, a few 
dozen vessels participated. By the next summer, 300 Soviet vessels fished in the same area. In April 
1966, a total of 118 Soviet vessels appeared on the narrow Continental Shelf off Washington state 
without any warning within a period of a few weeks, practically crowding smaller U.S. vessels out of 
their traditional fishing grounds. As a result, the U.S. Congress extended U.S. fishery limits an addi- 
tional 9 miles to 12 miles, a step which greatly shocked the Soviet Fisheries Ministry. 
9 Or about U.S. $11.2 billion at current official exchange rate of 1 ruble equal U.S. $1.32. 
