507 
“There should be an article stating specifically that the provi- 
sions of the treaty did not affect the legal status of the superad- 
jacent waters or air-space of the seabed.’’?! 
In proposing that the international regime’s executive board reach 
decisions only on the basis of concensus, the U.S.S.R. sought to ensure 
that the Soviet influenced countries would have effective veto power 
over organizational decisions. The U.S.S.R. has also proposed restrict- 
ing the power of the authority so that it would only ‘coordinate 
the activities of states and not direct them.’’”? 
In an attempt to appear somewhat more acceptable to developing 
nations at the third U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea in Caracas, 
1974, the Soviet Union endorsed exploitation by the Authority through 
service contracts and joint ventures as well as exploitation by states. 
Spokesmen for the German Democratic Republic also made a point 
of advocating that national liberation movements recognized by re- 
gional orgnizations can participate in the seabed authority. 
The Soviet position was formally presented in a working paper 
submitted in the Geneva session of the Law of the Sea Conference 
in 1975.23 The Soviet Union endorses a contract arrangement with 
a restricted number of contracts awarded to each state to prevent 
the development of monopolies. Combined evaluation and exploitation 
contracts would only be awarded to states or groups of states. Private 
entities could operate under subcontract to the contracting state. 
States may transfer their rights to seabed exploitation to other con- 
tracting states, but only with the approval of the international seabed 
organization. Contracts would be awarded by a sector method that 
would allow an equal balance of favorable versus less favorable areas 
of mineralization for each state. Sectors would be reserved for states 
not yet possessing deep seabed mining technology, and provision 
would be made for training their personnel by the states contracting 
for seabed exploitation. Sectors would also be reserved for exploitation 
by the international organization itself or by subcontracts. 
By combining evaluation and exploitation into a single contract, 
the Soviet proposal would protect the investment of a state conducting 
exploration from being arbitrarily denied the right to procede to ex- 
ploitation. On the other hand, the Soviets were concerned that ex- 
ploration that had already been carried out should not of itself convey 
the right to secure a contract for exploitation. In general, this working 
paper protects Soviet interests by favoring the entry of a developed 
country into seabed exploitation after the creation of an international 
organization, but essentially negates the lead of any parties already 
conducting evaluation. 
COMPARISON TO THE UNITED STATES 
United States firms have been giving serious consideration to deep 
seabed mining since the early 1960’s and U.S. technology for recover- 
ing manganese nodules was first ocean tested in 1970. Several firms 
have now completed the exploration and evaluation stage and are 
21 United Nations. A/AC 138/SR 56, 1971, p. 154. 
22 United Kingdom. A/AC 138/SR 56, 1971, jas ISIS) 
8 United Nations. A/CONF. 62/C.1/L.12, 1975, 15 p. 
