508 
ready to procede to commercial development. However, progress 
toward commercial development is being severely retarded by the 
lack of security private firms feel is necessary to protect the large 
investments required for commercial scale operations (on the order 
of $300 to $500 million for each mine site). 
Despite numerous exploratory and sampling expeditions there are 
no solid indications that the Soviet Union has developed a commercial 
seabed mining capability. Inspection of import and export tabulations 
of mineral commodities of the U.S.S.R. would suggest that offshore 
mining development in the Soviet Union has been primarily stimulated 
by the desire to become self sufficient in metals that are now imported 
(primarily tin), or considerably more expensive to mine on land 
(titanium minerals). Consequently, developing expensive technology 
to recover manganese nodules from the deep seabed would not be 
as pressing a concern to the U.S.S.R. as it would be to the United 
States which imports the metals contained in manganese nodules 
(primarily nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese). Furthermore, the 
Soviets have a continuing problem of inefficient recovery of copper 
and nickel from ores resulting in the loss of considerable amounts 
of metals”*:?> According to some observers, Soviet authorities recog- 
nize that the solution to this problem could be dependent on greater 
input of technical and other assistance from the Western World.”6 
Since recovery of metals from manganese nodules requires a certain 
amount of sophistication, one might suspect that the Soviets have 
not developed the technology to process nodules 
On the other hand, while the U.S.S.R. is essentially self sufficient 
or a major exporter of the major metals contained in manganese 
nodules, the Soviet Union continues to express interest in attaining 
seabed mining capability. One reason would be that mineral exports 
are a major source of foreign exchange needed to pay for Soviet 
imports. In order to maintain an adequate level of mineral exports, 
the Soviet Union is stressing increased recovery and development 
of mineral resources in all areas. Another possible explanation for 
Soviet interest in the deep seabed is the idea of ‘keeping a foot 
in the door” along with other industrialized countries. If the deep 
seabed resources were to be developed, the Soviet Union would want 
to have a major hand in the exploitation. 
The United States also has a technological lead in the extraction 
of minerals from seawater. In the United States magnesium is extracted 
from ordinary seawater, whereas the U.S.S.R. has mastered its extrac- 
tion only from water containing much higher concentrations. 
In informal negotiating sessions in Geneva, the United States 
proposed a mechanism for reserving one-half the commercially valua- 
ble mine sites for the international seabed authority to exploit by 
contractural joint ventures in which the authority would control the 
terms and conditions. In an equivalent area the sovereign states or 
their nationals would be free to exploit the seabed resources under 
contract in a responsible and nondiscriminatory fashion. Both types 
of contractual arrangements would provide for profit sharing with 
developing countries. 
*4 U.S. Bureau of Mines. 1971 Minerals Yearbook, v. III, ‘Area Reports: International,”’ U.S. Govt. 
Print. Office, Washington, D.C., 1973, p. 840. 
°5 Mining Journal. Soviet Eye on Mining, August 15, 1975, pp. 113-114. 
26 Ibid., p. 114. 
