570 
in ocean science and technology. It can be said, without much hesita- 
tion, that America ruled the waves in the period immediately following 
World War II. 
The situation has changed considerably over the past 25 years. 
Although U.S. dependence on the oceans for both national security 
and economic well-being has dramatically increased during the past 
quarter of a century, awareness of ocean dependence has not always 
been translated into an active policy geared to optimizing the ocean 
and its resources for the well-being of the Nation. The United States 
has neglected its merchant marine and coastal fisheries, and in recent 
years marine science and technology have received much less Govern- 
ment attention than during the decades of the fifties and sixties. 
Moreover, for a variety of reasons elaborated on in this chapter, 
‘the U.S. Navy may no longer be able to fulfill properly its sea control 
and power projection missions in areas of vital important to the United 
States and its allies. 
By contrast, the Soviet Union, traditionally a land power, has 
emerged from its postwar position of maritime insignificance to its 
newly acquired status as one of the world’s leading maritime powers. 
The Soviet Union, which is not as bound by centuries of maritime 
tradition, has developed a navy which is primarily designed to interfere 
with U.S. naval missions of sea control and power projection in the 
North Atlantic and North Pacific Oceans. It designed and developed 
a modern distant-water fishing fleet and a merchant marine serving 
both its economic and its political and national security interests. 
Although behind the United States in overall marine scientific and 
technological capability, the Soviets are making rapid progress in these 
areas. Large resources in manpower and money have been allocated 
to the building of the world’s largest ocean-going oceanographic fleet. 
A massive infusion of Western shipbuilding, offshore drilling equip- 
ment, and other marine technology have helped to upgrade Soviet 
technology in these areas. 
The Soviet Union recognized, some 20 years ago, the importance 
of the oceans, as a source of animal protein and raw materials, and 
the economic value of the merchant marine, in an era of expanding 
world trade. It also recognized the political and national security value 
of an expanding merchant marine serving all of the world’s major 
trading routes; a merchant marine designed to optimize both economic 
and national security needs (arms shipments). The development of 
the American Polaris submarines emphasized the strategic importance 
of the oceans, and the Cuban missile crisis taught the Soviets that 
they could not protect their overseas allies without a blue-water capa- 
bility. Top-level recognition of the growing importance of the oceans 
was translated into a crarefully designed ocean policy which integrated 
the various elements of seapower. No element of seapower was al- 
lowed to develop without regard for its impact on other such elements. 
This chapter attempts to compare various aspects of Soviet and 
U.S. ocean capabilities and to examine the implications of Soviet 
ocean development for the United States. It is important, in any 
analysis of Soviet and U.S. ocean capabilities, to keep in mind the 
actual dependence of the two nations on the oceans. The United 
States is, except as to marine fisheries, far more dependent on the 
oceans than is the Soviet Union for economic well-being and national 
