574 
capability which, taken together, adds 398 vessels to the Western 
fleet, including destroyers, escorts, and 135 attack submarines.” On 
the Soviet side, Warsaw Pact members (excluding the U.S.S.R.) have 
small navies with primarily coastal responsibilities. 
Any comparison of naval strength which is limited to numbers, 
however, has little meaning. Differing strategies and doctrines deter- 
mine forces. For example, there are now Soviet equivalents for the 
13 U.S. aircraft carriers which consume 50 percent of the U.S. Navy 
budget. Breaking down by subcategories still provides no accurate 
picture of comparative naval strength. Some analysts make little if 
any distinction between a 90,000-ton Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and 
a small 1,000- to 3,000-ton ASW or mine warfare ship. Other analysts 
look at total tonnage or at naval and shipbuilding budgets. None 
of those assessments take account of such major factors as differing 
concepts and strategies (what the fleets are for), how well they can 
support the concepts, comparative costs and productivity in shipbuild- 
ing, and cost comparisons of manpower versus hardware. 
On the other hand, comparing fleet sizes can serve a limited func- 
tion. Carefully done, it gives some idea of relative growth over the 
past two decades. In times of peace, a large and impressive fleet 
can serve the useful political purpose of ‘‘showing the flag.” Large 
numbers provide the capability to maintain more visibility abroad, 
especially in developing nations. While Soviet major combatants are 
generally smaller than U.S. equivalents, this fact is not always obvious 
to observers. Soviet vessels are heavily armed and look impressive. 
Even the smaller Soviet naval craft, or one of their large fleet of 
distant-water fishing trawlers or oceanographic research ships serve 
a psychological purpose, when seen as part of the enormous Soviet 
fleet behind it. It demonstrates power and thereby contributes to 
the impression of a Soviet Union which is now a seafaring nation 
of global importance. In any fleet comparison, it would be misleading 
to exclude all minor combatants. The small coastal craft make the 
Soviet Nation’s coastline relatively invulnerable to naval attacks. 
Moreover, in some areas like the Eastern Mediterranean (where the 
United States until recent years had complete sea control), small 
craft contribute to the current balance. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war, an Israeli destroyer was sunk by ship-to-ship missiles from a 
Soviet-built Egyptian patrol craft. Although this incident may be 
unique, the fact that a small patrol craft destroyed a ship 10 times 
its size indicates that small ships do represent a threat when they 
are equipped with modern weapon’s technology. John Collins, Senior 
Specialist in National Security Affairs at the Congressional Research 
Service of the Library of Congress, summed up the United States- 
Soviet quantitative naval strength as follows: 
Ten years ago, the Soviet Navy had already outstripped the United States 2 to 
1 in attack submarines (336 to 169), but its major surface fleets had just begun 
to break out of their coastal cocoons and compete on high seas. Today, they have 
more major combatants in every category except aircraft carriers, and a virtual 
monopoly on surface-to-surface antiship cruise missiles, which are mounted on cruisers, 
destroyers, submarines and small craft. The Soviets have even surpassed the United 
States in numbers of amphibious ships, ending once dramatic U.S. dominance—not 
because they built many more, but because the United States has halved its force 
since 1965.8 
7 Congressional Record, May 19, 1976, $7511. 
U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, ‘United States-Soviet Military Balance,” op cit. p. 6. 
