576 
Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin recently released data indicat- 
ing that the United States outbuilt the Soviet Union in nuclear- 
powered attack submarines in the past 10 years."' Navy officials 
testified correctly before a congressional hearing specifically dealing 
with nuclear attack submarines that the Soviet outbuilt the United 
States in nuclear submarines in 1974 by 10 to 3, and in 1975 by 
9 to 2, but they did not distinguish between attack submarines and 
ballistic-missile submarines.!? Neither statement appears to be incor- 
rect, but the use of different data creates confusion. 
While Navy spokesmen are the first to warn that one should not 
add apples and oranges, some of their own spokesmen do just that 
at congressional hearings. It is unfortunate that, by using different 
sources or different starting dates (the Soviets started their major 
construction program in the 1960’s; the United States began a signifi- 
cant replacement program in the 1970’s), or by quoting numbers 
of ships or total tonnages constructed, different spokesmen of various 
interest groups have provided totally different interpretations of pro- 
jected United States and Soviet naval strength. This kind of confusion 
diverts attention from the most important questions, which are: 
(a) Does the United States currently have the kind of navy it 
needs to perform sea control and power projection missions? 
(b) In view of the changing ocean environment and the perceived 
Soviet and minor power threat, what kind of navy does the United 
States need to meet the challenges of the 1980’s and 1990’s? 8 
COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES 
The relevant, but highly controversial, issue is which navy reflects 
the best concept for today’s world, and which navy does the job 
it is designed to do better.’ 
The United States, with major allies overseas and growing depen- 
dence on foreign trade, must be able to use the seas for commercial 
and military traffic of all kinds. In other words, the United States 
"New York Times, June 20, 1976. 
Ibid. Spokesmen for the Navy maintain that Congressman Aspin is correct in saying that the 
United States built more nuclear attack submarines than the U.S.S.R.—45 to 43—in the period 1966 
to 1975. However, they argue that the United States shifted emphasis from building strategic sub- 
marines (SSBN’s) to attack submarines (SSN’s) in 1966. The Soviets did the reverse, outbuilding the 
United States 51 to 8 in the same period in strategic submarines. In total, the Navy maintains, the 
Soviet Union outbuilt the United States 94 to 53 in all categories of nuclear submarines. 
Related to the debate concerning size and composition of the fleet of the future is the issue of 
propulsion of aircraft carriers and carrier task forces. The difference in cost between a conventional 
and an all-nuclear Navy are considerable and ought to be weighed against all other costs and benefits 
of a nuclear Navy. Alva Bowen of the Congressional Research Service calculated the difference 
between an 500- and 600-ship Navy at about $17.7 billion (or 28.4 percent) over a period of 10 
years. He also calculated that an all-nuclear shipbuilding program would cost over a period of 25 
years about $9 billion (or 21.9 percent) more than an all-conventional shipbuilding program, if four 
escorts are needed for each aircraft carrier task force. If, however, six escorts are planned for each 
carrier task force the difference between an all-nuclear and an all-conventional option would be 
$18.4 billion (or 44.6 percent). 
See: Alva M. Bowen, ‘“‘Memorandum on Comparison of Costs of All-Nuclear vs. Non-Nuclear 
Navy, 1976-2001,"’ Congressional Research Service (unpublished document), Washington, D.C., 
May 10, 1976. 
See also: Senator Robert Taft, Jr., ‘““A Modern Military Strategy for the United States,” op. cit., p. 
52s 
Senator Taft’s construction program would add about $2.5 billion per year for ship construction, 
part of which would have to come from lowering the budget of a reduced Army. : 
“Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, former CNO, quoted in Norman Polmar, ‘tA Fleet for the Future: Some 
Modest Suggestions,’’ Sea Power, April 1976, p. 12. 
