580 
Mediterranean have not shrunk commensurately. As a result, the 
smaller fleet of today is overworked in the attempt to maintain 
those commitments. The consequence has been a distressing 
decline of the material readiness of the fleet . . .78 
A striking example of what he meant by the distressing decline of 
the fleet readiness was his recollection of the Mayaguez incident. 
Dr. Schlesinger wrote: 
The decay in the condition of the fleet was dramatically underscored during the 
response to the Mayaguez incident. The 31-year old carrier, Hancock, which had been 
operating without one of its four shafts, limped belatedly from Subic Bay toward 
the Gulf of Thailand at 23 knots; it also never arrived at the scene. The helicopter 
carrier Okinawa, with part of its boiler plant off the line, crept along at 13 knots; 
it also never arrived at the scene. The escort vessel Holt, the first ship at the scene, 
had power-supply problems, and consequently its main battery was down the night 
before the engagement. Clearly, this Nation cannot for long tolerate the present readi- 
ness condition of the U.S. Navy, if we are to continue to rely on it for rapid response.”® 
Norman Polmar, the Washington editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships 
agrees with Dr. Schlesinger’s view about the state of readiness of 
the aged U.S. fleet. He concluded that the U.S. Navy is declining 
in several categories at a time when the Soviet Navy is increasing.*° 
Mr. Polmar states that there are indeed areas where the U.S. Navy 
does have modern ships, “*. . . but in an overall comparison of active 
fleets, the Soviet Navy now is larger on the surface and underwater, 
and significantly more modern in certain categories.’ *? 
While U.S. naval missions have remained basically unchanged in 
the past 30 years, in spite of considerable reduction of the fleet, 
Soviet missions may have expanded with the growing size and capabili- 
ties of their fleet. Initially, Soviet naval stratgegy was aimed at defend- 
ing the large Russian coastline. A large fleet of submarines, small 
coastal surface combatants, and a naval air force were designed for 
this purpose. The result of the ambitious naval ship construction pro- 
gram of the 1960’s has been a gradual develoment of a forward 
strategy aimed at denying the United States control of vital parts 
of the world oceans, in the Norwegian Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Sea 
of Japan, and possibly in the eastern Mediterranean and the Red 
Sea. 
Last year’s “‘Okean 1975” naval exercises demonstrated that the 
present combination of missile-armed bombers, nuclear and conven- 
tional submarines, and guided-missile surface combatants give the 
Soviet Navy both a good longstanding defensive and a new forward 
strategy, which appears to become increasingly offensive in nature. 
Strategically, the Soviet Union has the initiative. It can control the 
seas adjacent to Soviet territory and, given the easier nature of the 
sea-denial mission, it may also be in a position to prevent U.S. sea 
operations in areas of vital importance to U.S. national security. 
*8 Ibid., p. 148. 
**Ibid., p. 148. The state of readiness is of great importance. The side which controls more ships in 
good state of combat-readiness and deployment, is likely to be the first on the scene in case of a cri- 
sis somewhere. Will the other party risk a confrontation? 
**Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Challenge for the 1970’s, New York: Crane Russak & Company, 
Inc., 1974, p. 105. 
31 Ibid., p. 104. 
