581 
The Soviet Union, while currently capable of deploying an effective 
sea-denial force in the north Atlantic, the eastern Mediterranean, and 
its own coastal waters, has also begun to build a balanced blue- 
water navy of its own. Its recent shipbuilding program (1969-76) 
reflects this effort. 
For almost two decades the Soviet Union concentrated on building 
small ships, with an average tonnage of 3,520 dead weight tons (as 
opposed to 8,776 for the United States). In recent years (1969-76), 
however, the Soviet Union has emphasized the construction of larger 
ships, with an average tonnage of 6,228 dead weight tons (as opposed 
to 9,526 for the United States).%? In ‘““Seapower and the State,’’ Soviet 
Admiral Gorshkov maintained that the multifaceted activity of the 
Navy in war and in peace and the broad range of missions accom- 
plished by it (each of which demands the participation of various 
forces and equipment) have generated the need to balance naval 
forces with respect to various criteria and characteristics. 
In addition to its sea-denial mission, such a balanced navy will 
provide the means for a more aggressive foreign policy, particularly 
in contested areas of the developing world where the Soviet Union 
is ideologically committed to a policy of support for revolutionary 
movements. In Gorshkov’s words: 
. . . In the policy of our Party and state, the Soviet Navy is emerging as a factor 
for stabilizing the situation in various areas of the world, fostering the strengthening 
of peace and friendship between peoples and acting as a deterrent to the aggressive 
aspirations of the imperialist states.** 
A balanced fleet will enable the Soviet Union to project its own 
power overseas. It will provide the U.S.S.R. with the option (in the 
event limited military conflicts are brewing) “‘to employ and extend 
a military threat to any level, beginning with a demonstration of 
military might and ending with the landing of a landing party.” 
On the other hand, with the growth in size of the Soviet blue-water 
surface fleet, their surface combatants will become increasingly vul- 
nerable to U.S. submarines and surface ships, particularly in the open 
ocean where the Soviets have no air cover. The Soviet Navy can 
partially offset this disadvantage and the disadvantages of its own 
geography by acquiring more naval air-bases overseas. 
It is difficult to project Soviet intentions with any degree of certain- 
ty. Its early postwar emphasis on the construction of small surface 
combatants and limited range submarines was primarily defensive in 
nature. The Soviet naval buildup in the 1950’s was initially developed 
in response to a threat which it perceived from traditional western 
naval powers; specifically it is a response to Western, primarily United 
States, aircraft carriers and submarines carrying nuclear warheads. 
The growing emphasis on larger, blue-water surface ships, including 
aircraft carriers, coupled with increasing use of overseas bases and 
* Alva Bowen, Jr., Comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Naval Shipbuilding, Congressional Research 
Service, Washington, D.C., Mar. 5, 1976, p. 5. 
*° Department of Defense, Excerpts from Admiral of the Soviet Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Seapower 
and the State, (unpublished document), Washington, D.C., 1976. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Tbid. 
