583 
Together with the U.S. Navy, the NATO Navy clearly gives the edges in naval 
supremacy to the United States and its allies over any combination of navies that 
the Soviets and their allies can put to sea.* 
They also argue that the United States has several large naval bases 
around the world and hundreds of open ports where its ships drop 
anchor; a marine corps far superior in strength and experience to 
the Soviet counterpart; and experienced and battle-tested sailors and 
pilots.” 
They frequently cite Soviet institutional economic weaknesses, pro- 
jections of lower GNP growth rates in the coming 5-year plan, and 
internal competitions for scarce Soviet resources. They also stress 
recent naval construction trends favoring larger, more expensive, and 
more sophisticated ships, possibly making economic difficulties worse. 
Those who hold this point of view say that the Soviet Navy is not 
likely te expand, and that it may in fact shrink as older combatants 
need to be replaced with larger, more sophisticated, and costlier ships. 
Those who feel that the U.S. Navy has already lost, or that it 
is in the process of losing its ability to control the seas and project 
power overseas against Soviet opposition agree that the U.S. Navy 
today would win a classic fleet versus fleet confrontation with the 
Soviet Navy in the open sea. The Soviet Navy is not designed for 
such confrontations. Instead, these critics worry about the following 
developments: 
The U.S. Navy has emphasized force projection at the expense 
of sea control. 
Emphasis on very expensive carrier task forces has prevented 
development of a balanced Navy of both high performance and 
low-cost single purpose vessels. 
Technological trends still favor submarine over ASW forces; 
improved satellite reconnaissance makes hiding at sea more dif- 
ficult and surface ships more vulnerable. 
The aircraft carrier, which consumes 50 percent of the Navy 
budget and is very limited in number is increasingly vulnerable 
to surprise submarine and air and surface missile attack, particu- 
larly in areas like the eastern Mediterranean. 
The large Soviet submarine force can play havoc with U.S. 
efforts to project power ashore and maintain communication lines. 
Soviet “‘minor combatants” have been undervalued. While their 
range is limited, technological trends put more and more destruc- 
tive power at the disposal of smaller and smaller units. 
Recently acquired Soviet base rights in Africa improve their 
blue-water capability and increases the vulnerability of vital oil 
supply lines from the Middle East to western industrial nations. 
36Task Force on Defense Policy of the Members of Congress for Peace through Law, Congres- 
sional Record, May 19, 1976, p. S7511. 
37 Ibid. 
69-315 O - 76 -- 39 
