584 
Vulnerability of the U.S. Fleet 
Immediately following the Second World War, no nation disputed 
U.S. control of the seas. Aircraft carriers were the best means to 
project power ashore. 
But the Soviet Union decided to plan a naval strategy and to build 
a Navy that could deny sea control to the United States and prevent 
the projection of U.S. naval power to Soviet shores. This plan did 
not include carriers until recently. Instead, it called initially for large 
numbers of small guided-missile ships, attack submarines, and land- 
based missile-equipped naval aircraft. They were designed to work 
together in countering American seapower. 
Gradually, as the initial systems grew, the Soviets started adding 
the means necessary to achieve a more distant and forward-oriented 
strategy. 
For example, the ““Okean 75” exercise involved more than 200 
Soviet nuclear submarines and surface vessels and 400 aircraft operat- 
ing in three oceans in well coordinated maneuvers, which required 
a sophisticated worldwide communication network, including satellites. 
Soviet aircraft operated from bases in the Soviet Union, Cuba, Guinea, 
and Berbera in the Somali Republic. Soviet squadrons exercised from 
the Sea of Japan to the Caribbean and from Norway’s North Cape 
to the Azores. A task force headed by two missile-armed cruisers 
conducted what seemed to be anticarrier exercises in the Tyrrhenian 
Sea area of the Mediterranean. Four naval task groups operated in 
the Western Pacific, and heavy concentrations of submarines and sur- 
face ships operated in the North Atlantic. Naval aircraft flew over 
the North Atlantic, the North Pacific, and the northeastern part of 
the Indian Ocean (tanker route). ‘““Okean 75” was an impressive show 
of Soviet naval strength beyond traditional coastal waters. It prompted 
Secretary of the Navy Middendorf to say: 
It is apparent that the numbers of new ships and weapon systems which the 
Soviet Navy is acquiring and the experience it is gaining from its continuing high 
level of operations in distant areas are giving the Soviet Navy the level of capability, 
professionalism, and importantly, self-confidence to explore new naval strategies which 
could be applied against the United States in various stages of hostilities ranging from 
an economic blockade to an all-out nuclear war. Okean 75 saw Soviet naval units 
Operating in more or less traditional areas such as the Norwegian Sea but also in 
areas such as the sea approaches to Europe, in the approaches to the Persian Gulf, 
off the west coast of Africa and off the coasts of Japan. In most of the exercise 
activity, the Soviets displayed a remarkably sophisticated and well-integrated capability 
for surveillance of the surface of the oceans, making extensive use of sophisticated 
systems. Having located ships on the high seas with this system, Soviet surface, air, 
and submarine forces exercised in convoy and anticonvoy operations, reconnaisance 
of vital sea lines of communication, and the control of key chokepoints throughout 
the world. These new departures were in addition to the normal exercising of Soviet 
Navy anticarrier and antisubmarine missions, as well as simulated strategic strike at 
the culmination of the exercise.*® 
Okean 75 has shown that a Soviet Navy equipped with antiship 
missiles with high-yield warheads, in combination with land-based 
coastal aircraft and submarines, makes it impossible to be reasonably 
sure any longer that U.S. aircraft carriers can carry out the power 
projection missions for which they were primarily designed. 
*® Remarks by Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf before a meeting of the National Aviation 
Club in Washington, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Mar. 8, 1976. 
