585 
The postwar period of unopposed U.S. sea control would naturally 
affect the development of U.S. Navy doctrine and hardware, leading 
to a fleet ideally suited to intervention from privileged sanctuaries 
at sea.“® This emphasis on carriers has subordinated other surface 
combatants to defense of the carriers. According to Vice Admiral 
Steele: ‘“‘This has shriveled the Navy’s fighting ability on the surface 
until it is now incapable of standing up to Soviet cruisers armed 
with potent long-range cruise missiles.” *° 
Several other knowledgeable observers also believe that carriers 
are very vulnerable, particularly in coastal areas where a potential 
enemy can launch a surprise attack, firing off missiles from coor- 
dinated air, surface, and subsurface platforms. The Eastern Mediter- 
ranean is said to be one of the areas where Soviet air and naval 
power effectively counterbalance U.S. naval forces.*! 
While anti-ship missiles may not sink a carrier, missile hits with 
high-explosive warheads at the right places (i.e. a hangar or flight 
deck loaded with planes, fuel and ordnance) , could \hamper or 
stop the launch or landing of aircraft for critical periods of time. 
Soviet ship-to-ship missiles with nuclear warheads can, of course, sink 
a Carrier. 
William S. Lind, legislative aide for military affairs to Senator 
Robert Taft of Ohio, suggested in a recent article that even missile- 
equipped minor-nation forces pose increasing threats to aircraft car- 
riers stationed off the coasts of unfriendly minor powers as a 
“presence” force. Lind argues that, in view of the diplomatic and 
domestic consequences of a preemptive strike, a scenario can be 
envisioned in which the minor power attacks first with missile-firing 
patrol boats and possibly cripples the carrier.” 
Aircraft carriers may be vulnerable to Soviet submarine attacks 
even outside coastal waters. Vice Admiral Steele, himself a submarine 
commander before commanding the U.S. 7th Fleet, said about the 
submarine threat: “‘In spite of almost frantic efforts and brave talk 
by the Navy over many years, the submarine threat to U.S. surface 
forces is grave.” *? Under fair weather conditions, airborne ASW 
systems may be effective, according to Steele, “‘. . . but reliable, 
all-direction, continuous air protection for surface forces, including 
aircraft carriers, is still not possible.’’* 
Even under bad weather conditions, submarines can operate at nor- 
mal speed and launch torpedoes. They are hardly detectable. Carriers, 
on the other hand, cannot function as efficiently under adverse 
weather conditions. Vice Admiral Steele maintains that two or more 
nuclear-powered attacking submarines can saturate the defenses of 
an aircraft carrier group.* 
39 Vice Adm. George P. Steele (ret.), ““A Fleet To Match Our Real Needs,” Washington Post, Mar. 
16, 1976. 
4° Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Williams S. Lind, ‘““Old Thinking Will Not Keep Sea Lanes Open’’, Washington Star, Aug. 3, 
1975. 
43 Steele, op. cit. 
44 Ibid. 
45 The CNO maintains that two submarines cannot saturate carrier defenses. 
