586 
It is not difficult for several submarines to act in concert.*® The 
latest Soviet nuclear submarines emit a lower noise level, and they 
are equipped with more sensitive sensors, which means they can detect 
surface vessels at greater distances than could earlier models. With 
respect to antisubmarine destroyers, propellers make more noise as 
speed increases while the effectiveness of sonar detection equipment 
diminishes noise and speed increase.*” Helicopters, and some other 
ASW equipment, are able to avoid this noise-speed problem, but 
they have other difficulties in detecting the presence of submarines. 
Current trends in submarine technology and construction, according 
to Rear Admiral Wegener (Bundesmarine, ret.), clearly favor the sub- 
marine over antisubmarine warfare measures.*® 
This discussion does not necessarily mean that all aircraft carriers 
have outlived their usefulness. Zumwalt, Steele, and numerous other 
critics believe that carriers continue to serve a unique purpose. Some 
analysts believe that carriers should be kept beyond the range of 
cruise missiles until enemy defenses have been reduced or eliminated 
since they can still destroy enemy vessels or shore installations, search 
out and destroy enemy submarines over long distances and at high 
speeds, provide air support for land battles, interdict land or sea- 
based enemy aircraft, and launch cruise missile attacks against ships 
and ports.*® 
The question of the vulnerability of aircraft carriers is a very con- 
troversial one at the moment. The issue may turn on who attacks 
first. Soviet submarines or surface ships or both often “‘attach”’ them- 
selves to American carriers and follow them constantly. Such sub- 
marines and surface ships would be politically, and sometimes physi- 
cally, difficult to destroy during peacetime; if war commences they 
could launch a heavy and crippling surprise salvo, at point blank 
range, against the American carriers. If the first attack creates enough 
damage to prevent the launching of aircraft, the carrier is vulnerable 
to later attacks aimed at hampering or preventing repairs or at destroy- 
ing the ship.*® Once the carriers are eliminated, enemy attack sub- 
marines could conduct raider warfare against allied merchant ships 
with virtual impunity. Without carriers, the U.S. Navy would lose 
its air superiority, and Soviet missile cruisers and missile destroyers 
would be better able to eliminate American cruisers and destroyers.™ 
The U.S. Navy need not be overly pessimistic about the vulnerability 
of carriers. Very few carriers were destroyed in World War II, and 
since then there have been significant improvements in the damage- 
control systems of carriers. It is said that these improvements make 
it nearly impossible to destroy a carrier with conventional weapons. 
Critics agree that if the carriers can escape severe initial damage, 
the chance of their being successfully attacked by fast nuclear sub- 
46 Steele, op. cit. 
Rear Adm. Edward Wegener (ret.), The Soviet Naval Offensive, Bonn, Germany, 1974, p. 14. 
49 ae ee R. Zumwalt, Jr., “High-Low,” op cit., p. 6. 
5° Congressional Record, May 19, 1976, p. $7512. 
51 Wegener, op cit., p. 105. 
