587 
marines and missiles launched from bombers or surface combatants 
is substantially diminished. 
The fact that the Soviet Union has begun its own carrier construc- 
tion program (with smaller ships equipped with helicopters, cruise 
missiles, ASW ordnance, and V/STOL aircraft) suggests that carriers 
have some important mission to perform in the Soviet strategic design, 
which seems to differ substantially from ours. 
These points do not silence the critics of carrier construction. They 
argue that the expenditure of 50 percent of the Navy’s budget on 
such vessels is not justifiable unless the carriers are reasonably sure 
of being able to carry out their power projection mission. They say 
that carriers can no longer project power in key areas of importance 
to NATO. They also say that the Chief of Naval Operations own 
testimony assigns first priority for the Navy to sea control,** whereas 
carriers are primarily power-projection ships as to which sea control 
is only a collateral function. If carriers cannot assure power projection, 
and if they are of secondary importance for sea control, today’s Navy 
may, according to its critics, provide for little in the way of national 
security. The report of the Task Force on Defense Policy of the 
Members of Congress for Peace through Law conclude: ““We may 
indeed have the worst of both possible worlds—a naval force which 
is unable to adequately perform either sea control or power projec- 
tion.** 
The issue of carrier vulnerability is likely to remain controversial 
until it is resolved by the evidence of actual combat. 
THE U.S. FLEET OF THE FUTURE 
In recent years, the Congress has begun to reassert its responsibility 
to participate more fully in foreign and defense policy. Previously, 
the Department of Defense stated its weapon requirements, and the 
Congress rarely questioned anything other than the size of the overall 
Pentagon budget and some details as to various weapons systems. 
The Congress is no longer satisfied with such a passive role. It 
is beginning to question fundamental assumptions about U.S. foreign 
policy and defense. For example, is there really no alternative to 
an ever growing defense budget, in real terms, without risking U.S. 
national security? There are no ready answers to this and other 
questions, but the growing congressional interest in defining and debat- 
ing the underlying concepts of foreign and defense policy will 
have a major impact on the size and composition of the U.S. 
Fleet of the future. 
One has to examine a number of variables in determining the future 
needs of the U.S. Navy, such as: Soviet foreign policy and U.S. percep- 
52 Congressional Record, May 19, 1976, p. S7512. See Also: Capt. Robert B. Bathurst, “The 
Lemming Complex: Ritual Death in the Norwegian Sea,” Naval War College Review, May-June 1974 
53 DOD Directive 5100.1, issued on Dec. 31, 1958, reads that the primary mission of the Navy is: 
To organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained 
combat operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air com- 
ponents—specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy com- 
merce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital 
sea lanes of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of 
naval operations, and to conduct such land and air operations as may be essential to the prosecution 
of a naval campaign. 
Quoted from: Congressional Record, May 19, 1976, p. $7512. 
54Ibid., p. S7512. Analysing the annual NATO Norwegian sea exercises, Capt. Robert B. Bathurst, 
professor at the Naval War College, came to a similar conclusion. See: Bathurst, op cit., p. 38. 
