588 
tion of the Soviet strategic naval concept and challenge; U.S. foreign 
policy and the development of ocean-related interests; and technologi- 
cal trends. 
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND NAVAL STRATEGY 
The Soviet Union is likely to continue its policy of detente with 
the West as long as (1) it serves Soviet political and economic in- 
terests and (2) the current nuclear stalemate provides a credible deter- 
rent to potential Soviet aggression in areas of considerable importance 
to the Western alliances. Former Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze 
contends that under the terms of the SALT agreements, there is 
every prospect that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue the 
objective of a nuclear superiority that is not merely quantitative but 
which is designed to produce a theoretical war-winning capability. 
Nitze concludes that if such a condition were achieved, “the Soviet 
Union would adjust its policies and actions in ways that would un- 
dermine the present détente situation, with results that could only 
resurrect the danger of nuclear confrontation or, alternatively, increase 
the prospect of Soviet expansion through other means of pressure.” *® 
It is difficult to project when and where heavy pressure would 
be brought to bear by the Soviet Union. Détente with the West 
has served the Soviet Union well. It has resulted in de facto recogni- 
tion of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe at the 1975 Helsinki 
Conference, and it has influenced some NATO members to reduce 
their defense expenditures at a time when the Soviet military budget 
is increasing. Détente has also created a favorable climate for access 
to much needed Western capital and advanced technology. 
There seems to be little doubt that the Soviet leadership still be- 
lieves that the eventual worldwide triumph of socialism is inevitable 
and that they are obligated to assist in the process.** The Soviet 
Union may not openly confront the NATO alliance in Europe, but 
instead it may first challenge the West in contested areas in the 
developing countries. If the West does not stand firm against Soviet 
adventurism, Soviet foreign policy is likely to become increasingly 
aggressive. The Kremlin leadership has on several occasions indicated 
that détente does not mean abandonment of its policy of support 
for national liberation movements. The Soviet Union realized as early 
as 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, that it needed a blue water 
capability to support its overseas allies. Its awareness of the growing 
dependence of the Western World on fuels and raw materials from 
the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America could easily 
lead it to conclude that mastery of the seas is essential to Soviet 
world hegemony. Whether or not the Soviet Union succeeds in export- 
ing revolution to strategically important areas of the third world, many 
Strategists believe that the desire to influence events in the third 
world is a major motivating force behind the current Soviet effort 
to build a major blue-water surface fleet. Only with the help of 
seapower can the continental limits be surmounted; only with 
seapower can Soviet influence—and possibly hegemony—be extended 
throughout the world.*” ' 
> Paul H. Nitze, “‘Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente’’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 54, No. 
2, January 1976, p. 207. 
56 Ibid., p. 208-210. 
57 Wegener, op. cit., p. 117. 
