589 
The Soviet Navy is not yet equipped for this task, on a worldwide 
scale. However, growing Soviet seapower has already succeeded in 
eliminating broad zones from western naval mastery, which once ex- 
tended up to the coast of the Soviet Union itself. As Soviet naval 
forces in the North Atlantic and eastern Mediterranean grow larger, 
threatened countries are more likely to conclude that NATO can 
no longer defend them. Such a conclusion might lead to withdrawals 
from the alliance, to neutralization, and finally to ‘‘Finlandization”’ 
of Europe.*® With the reopening of the Suez Canal, the Soviet Union 
has easy access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean in peacetime, 
and it has developed a network of maritime positions in the northern 
part of the Indian Ocean and its peripheral seas, such as the Red 
Sea. The West once maintained a series of bases all around this 
area, which is of such vital importance to western oil supplies. The 
West has lost all its maritime positions in the northern part of this 
area.°? A Soviet naval presence in the northern Indian Ocean does 
not, hwever, mean that the Soviet Union has sea control in this 
area since NATO still controls Soviet naval access to the eastern 
Mediterranean approaches. It is the eastern Mediterranean which is 
of decisive importance in the East-West confrontation. Naval strategic 
developments in the Indian Ocean and, as a consequence, political 
events in East Africa and in the Middle East, with its oil and popula- 
tion resources, hinge upon the future of this sea area.®? Western 
control of the eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean is necessary 
to protect vital security interests of Western nations and to allow 
cooperation with Middle East nations. It is questionable if it can 
be done with current force levels and without weakening the North 
Atlantic and North Pacific fleets. 
In a recently published book, “Seapower and the State,” S. G. 
Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, argues for sea 
control as a mission of the Soviet Navy. He calls for a balanced 
navy to carry out the multifaceted activity of his navy in war and 
in peace.®! 
The recent Soviet trend toward the construction of larger, multipur- 
pose, major combatants (including a V/STOL aircraft carrier) may 
indicate a Soviet ambition to achieve ultimate control of the seas. 
This phenomenon is interesting, because in the past Soviet strategy 
has, in general, been to avoid confronting the West and its naval 
forces with means of the same order. Soviet V/STOL aircraft carriers 
and other major combatants may become tempting targets for U.S. 
nuclear submarines and air power at sea, especially in the Pacific 
and North Atlantic Oceans. Perhaps the Soviet Navy intends to display 
aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean, where the Western Powers are 
weakest and where the Soviet Navy is gradually acquiring naval 
strategic positions and base rights. Soviet carrier task forces could 
lead to Soviet mastery of the northern part of the Indian Ocean 
and enable the Soviet Navy to interfere with western oil shipments 
from the Middle East in case of war. In view of the declining number 
°8 Ibid., p. 119. 
5° Ibid., p. 90. 
69 Ibid. ; 
51 Department of Defense, Translated material on “‘Seapower and the State” recently published by 
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Gorshkov, Washington, D.C., spring, 1976. 
