593 
Finally, there is intense competition for resources and recognition 
between the U.S. Navy’s three ‘“‘unions”’ (Zumwalt’s form): the avia- 
tors, the submariners, and the surface sailors. Until 1970, when Zum- 
walt became Chief of Naval Operations, aviators dominated that high 
naval office. 
The Soviet Union has responded successfully to the mighty Amer- 
ican post-war challenge at sea by building a forceful sea-denial fleet. 
Today, they are on their way to developing a balanced fleet in the 
more traditional western sense. How should the United States, in 
its turn, respond to the mighty Soviet challenge represented by a 
growing force of supersonic naval aircraft capable of delivering air- 
to-surface missiles against our surface fleet over vast areas of the 
oceans, a continuing production of varied advanced design nuclear 
powered submarines, and a blue-water surface navy, including carriers, 
equipped with antiship missiles? 
The only answer on which most experts will agree is that the Unisted 
States must have a superior fleet of balanced forces capable of fighting 
successfully against this array of weapon systems and it must simul- 
taneously be prepared for nonconventional challenges at sea by a 
minor power. Some of the options under consideration have already 
been discussed in this paper, but there are others also. 
The U.S. Navy must, to a larger extent than it has in the past, 
keep abreast of technological trends. While the United States holds 
a leading position in industrial technology, the Soviet Navy appears 
to be more advanced in the deployment of precision-guided missiles 
and in the development of reconnaissance technology. Solutions to 
the Soviet naval challenge are, of course, complicated by uncertainty 
about U.S. foreign policy itself in the post-Vietnam war era. 
The Navy is in a period of transition. In view of the long leadtime 
between a budget authorization and the completion of a new class 
of ships, the decisions that are being made today will affect the 
size and composition of the American fleet which will have to meet 
the challenges of the 1980’s and 1990’s. Each of the options described 
in this paper is likely to be costly, and the available funds will be 
limited. It is quite possible, as some observers maintain, that the 
Navy appropriations have been badly spent in recent years, and that 
a shift from bigger and more sophisticated ships to smaller and less 
expensive ships equipped with advanced guided missiles could result 
in both a more effective Navy and substantial savings. On the other 
hand, the All Volunteer Force opted for by the American people 
will continue to be very expensive, in light of inflationary trends 
and competiton for available manpower. The Soviet Union spends 
about one-third of its defense budget on manpower, whereas the 
United States spends over 50 percent of its defense budget on man- 
power.” Thus, the Soviet Union can spend a larger percentage of 
its navy budget hardware than can the United States. 
In view of almost unlimited legitimate demands on public funds, 
and after a quarter of a century of peace, the democratic countries 
of the West may be faced with the same danger as that which con- 
fronted the major maritime power of the early 17th century, the 
Republic of the United Netherlands. Johan de Witt, pensionary of 
the United Netherlands, once said about his people: 
™ Congressional Record, Apr. 5, 1976, p. $1905. 
