594 
... Never in time of peace and for fear of a rupture will they take resolutions 
strong enough to lead them to pecuniary sacrifices beforehand. The character of the 
Dutch is such that, unless danger stares them in the face, they are indisposed to 
lay out money for their own defence. I have to do with a people who, liberal to 
profusion where they ought to economize, are often sparing to avarice where they 
ought to spend.”® 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND OCEAN RELATED INTERESTS 
Decisions on naval construction programs taken today will affect 
the missions and tasks of the U.S. Navy of the late 1980’s and 1990’s. 
American foreign policy, after the Vietnam war, is in a state of flux. 
The Nation has for all purposes abandoned or is in the process of 
abandoning, its forward positions in Southeast Asia, and the future 
of its traditional alliances with South Korea and Taiwan is subject 
to debate. In the Mediterranean, the Navy is in danger of losing 
some or all of its bases. The prospect of Communist participation 
in the governments of one or more NATO nations would not only 
weaken the alliance but could lead to further losses of naval bases. 
At the same time, the United States is becoming increasingly depend- 
ent on foreign trade. The Nation’s traditional economic self-sufficiency . 
has ended, in substantial part because of the large and growing depend- 
ence on imported oil. Oil imports, estimated at less than 6.5 million 
barrels per day in 1975, are likely to grow to 7.5 million barrels 
or more per day in 1976. That figure could very well reach 9 to 
10 million barrels per day by the early 1980’s. In order to pay for 
this increase in oil imports—the cost may exceed $40 billion by 1980 
in current dollars—more industrial and agricultural products must be 
exported. A growing volume of raw materials, critical for industrial 
wellbeing, must also be imported within the next decade. In fact, 
the United States may become as dependent on foreign trade as 
are the nations of Western Europe today. Without these imports, 
the economic strength of the United States would be severely 
damaged, well beyond what the Nation experienced during the Great 
Depression of the 1930’s. Hence, a “fortress America” policy is not 
a realistic option. 
At sea, new challenges are ahead and along with them new sources 
for conflict. Commercial fisheries are being threatened with 
overexploitation in many parts of the world. The extension of national 
jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles is not likely to end all conflict. 
New mining opportunities are likely in the deep seabed. A peaceful 
solution to the issue of the exploitation of deep seabed minerals may 
be achieved at the Third Law of the Sea Conference, but, if it’s 
not, additional conflict is likely as to the ownership of the resources. 
Further into the future is the enormous potential for harvesting Ant- 
arctic krill; in volume (measured in annual maximum sustainable 
yield) it surpasses all other commercial fisheries together. Other min- 
ing activities, mariculture developments, construction of nuclear power 
plants on artificial islands, et cetera, offer great opportunities at sea, 
but they also contain the seeds of conflict. 
76 Quoted from: Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History, Boston, (Little, Brown, 
& Co., 1890), p. 49. A pensionary was somewhat equivalent to the position of a foreign minister 
today. 
