595 
The Third Law of the Sea Conference may not solve a great many 
problems directly related to the division of ocean space—including 
the seabed—and to multiple uses of ocean space; another source 
of conflict. 
The oceans and their resources are likely to become far more 
important to mankind in the future than they have been in the past. 
Despite the obvious need for international cooperation, the possibilities 
for conflict at sea may grow. 
In view of these changes in ocean uses and in the international 
environment, what kind of a Navy does the United States need? Will 
the Navy of the future be designed to cope only with the potential 
Soviet threat? In view of the current stalemate between the super- 
powers, how are small nations to be protected, with respect to each 
other and foreign sponsors? 
The stalemate between the superpowers has altered responses to 
challenges from minor powers. The United States controlled the seas 
and thus could have projected its power ashore during the Pueblo 
incident; instead it used diplomatic tools. The English Navy is clearly 
superior to the Icelandic Navy, but the United Kingdom opted for 
a settlement that caused great hardship among its fishermen instead 
of forcing its way into the waters claimed by Iceland. 
A new world order is evolving, and it calls for different responses. 
The Navy’s missions have not changed basically in the past two 
decades. Its principal tasks are still to maintain sea control, project 
power ashore, and maintain an overseas presence during peacetime. 
Until the middle of the 1960’s, few experts questioned the Navy’s 
ability to fullfill these missions. With the rapid rise of the Soviet 
Navy during the 1960’s and early 1970’s, some experts argued that 
the Navy had lost its ability to control the seas and project power 
in areas of vital importance to U.S. national security. Others, including 
the current Chief of Naval Operations, maintain that if current trends 
continue the United States will lose it in the next 5 to 10 years. 
There is general agreement about the growing strength of the Soviet 
Navy, but not about its intentions or about the need for the USS. 
Navy to counter Soviet moves in the oceans. There are those who 
argue that the United States could considerably reduce its overseas 
commitments, especially in Asia, and cut back on naval deployments 
accordingly. Others maintain that in view of the growing Soviet threat, 
the U.S. Navy needs to be expanded from the current 477, active 
fleet, to 600 ships in order to meet current overseas commitments. 
Finally, some believe that the United States can continue to meet 
its current commitments only with an 800-ship Navy. 
Different naval requirements are presented by the current Chief 
of Naval Operations and by his two predecessors. The current Chief 
of Naval Operations, Admiral Holloway, considers a 600-ship Navy 
the minimum which is acceptable. He argues that a 540-ship 
Navy—current active and reserve fleet, “falls considerably short—very 
short of what Joint Chiefs of Staff consider to be the prudent-risk- 
force levels for the U.S. Navy.’’7” The previous Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, Admiral Zumwalt, maintained that a 770-ship Navy was required 
to fulfill American commitments. His predecessor, Adm. Thomas 
Moorer, testified that he believed 850 ships were necessary to perform 
™ Testimony by Admiral Holloway. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 
Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 11500, pt. 1, Washington, D.C., February 1976, p. 801. 
