596 
the missions assigned to the U.S. Navy.’Are these figures based on 
different foreign policy considerations and consequently on different 
projections of naval missions and tasks? Are there considerable dif- 
ferences in the perception of the Soviet Naval threat? At a hearing 
before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives 
in March 1976, Admiral Holloway maintained that a 600-ship Navy 
was designed for a potential two-ocean war against the Warsaw Pact 
nations, and, in addition, for the maintenance of sea lines of communi- 
cation (SLOC) with South America.”? The specific reference to South 
America suggests no such sea control capability in the Indian Ocean. 
Moreover, South American SLOC have little meaning because even 
a small Navy could provide such protection. Testifying before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1976, the admiral 
said that the 600-ship Navy ‘‘would be capable of carrying out the 
strategy on the NATO southern flank while protecting vital POL 
(petroleum and oil lubricants); and supply SLOC. (sea lines of com- 
munication) in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.” ® 
Does the testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
imply that a 600-ship Navy will enble the Navy to deploy units in 
the Indian Ocean to secure the oil supply lines, or does it mean, 
as Admiral Holloway said elsewhere, that the supply lines from the 
Middle East will be defended by preventing Soviet ship movements 
from the North Atlantic to the Indian Oceans? ®! In view of the Soviet 
build-up of naval bases in the Red Sea,i Somalia, and possibly else- 
where around the African \continent,,can a 600-ship |Navy keep 
those vital supply lines open? 
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR THE U.S. FLEET OF THE FUTURE 
When Admiral Zumwalt became Chief of Naval Operations in 1970, 
he concluded the U.S. Navy was in danger of losing both sea control 
and the ability to project power ashore because of the growth of 
the Soviet fleet and the rapid decline in U.S. naval capabilities. He 
developed a long-term plan to reoptimize the Navy to meet the Soviet 
challenge. The plan called for integration of all aspects of maritime 
power and for the development of a balanced fleet. Following the 
Soviet example, where Air Force, Army, merchant marine, and the 
fishing and oceanographic fleet all contribute to the Navy mission, 
he tried—in vain—to persuade the Government to acquire similar 
assets in order to enhance the total power it might bring to bear 
in a crisis.°? Zumwalt was convinced that the power projection naval 
' forces were adequate, but that more and different ships were needed 
for the sea control mission. He worked out a plan for a balanced 
Navy of high-performance ships and weapons systems—which we al- 
ready had—with great flexibility and versatility, but costly, and 
moderate-cost, moderate-performance ships and systems that could 
78 See: Quoted by Admiral Widdell. See: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget, 
Force Structure and Long Range Projections, Hearings for the Task Force on National Security Pro- 
grams. Washington, D.C., July 1975. 
7° Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 11500, pt. 4, op. cit., p. 648. 
80U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Fiscal year 1977 Authorization for Milita- 
ty Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Person- 
nel Strength, pt. 2, Washington, D.C., February 1976, p. 1152. 
*! See: U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget, Task Force on Defense, Seminars, Service Chiefs on 
Defense Mission and Priorities, Sept. 18, 1975, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 15. 
82 See: Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, ‘‘High-Low’’, op. cit., p. 4. 
