597 
be turned out in relatively large numbers. Such a balanced Navy 
would insure that the Navy could be at enough places at the same 
time without spreading forces too thin, and get the job done.®? The 
mix would provide for optimum capacity within an acceptable budget. 
The different classes of smaller vessels would operate in coastal waters 
as strike vessels against enemy surface craft and as escorts for convoys 
and merchantmen or naval auxiliaries. The Zumwalt plan visualized 
starting work on four new classes of ships, all designed primarily 
for sea control—guided-missile hydrofoil patrol boats, patrol frigates, 
small helicopter-V/STOL carriers, and very fast troop transports 
equipped with aircraft. 
The Zumwalt proposal had the advantage of both optimum per- 
formance and cost-effectiveness. Project 60, as the plan was called, 
was offered as an alternative to the construction of large and costly 
high-performance ships. In Zumwalt’s own words: 
. . . An all-high Navy would be so expensive that it would not have enough ships 
to control the seas. An all-low Navy would not have the capability to meet certain 
kinds of threats or perform certain kinds of missions. In order to have both enough 
ships and good enough ships there had to be a mix of high and low.*4 
TABLE 4.—.Summary of projected shipbuilding costs} 
{In millions of fiscal year 1977 constant dollars] 
Expansion program Sustaining program Difference 
Type Number Total cost Number Total cost Number Cost 
Ballistic missile submarines ______ 23 19,992.0 23 19,992.0 0 0 
Attack submarines ______________ 29 = 8,946.5 10 3,085.0 19 5,861.5 
[LevRaye: Gane ay lly ye te Roe ila Te 4 8,081.2 4 8,081.2 0 0 
MightiGarnierss ates SIS eee 5 1,960.0 5 1,960.0 0 0 
@FUISETS) pees seh ges 2 asl, ol bal 5S 5,078.0 5 5,078.0 0 0 
I DECIROW AG) Seue ees eee ae 44 16,414.7 44 . 16,414.7 0 0) 
ESCOMS pe fee tee eee, ee 51 8,450.7 0) 0 51 8,450.7 
Amphibious! 2322222822 58259! Ne 9 1,350.0 4 600.0 5 750.0 
Replenishment ________________ 24 3,246.2 13 1,629.4 11 1,616.8 
/ NOD TET S Me ere ees 64 6,633.2 G0) 9 SSO 161 4 1,042.1 
pia tall rents; Senha fA Pa eh 258 80,152.5 168 62,431.4 S0e alia 2alel 
1This table was compiled by aggregating costs shown in the detailed analysis, many of which are estimates derived 
by indexing costs of earlier ships to fiscal year 1977 dollars. As such, they should not be considered exact, but repre- 
sentative, within a range of 10 to 15 percent. 
Source: Alva M. Brown, Jr., “U.S. Naval Expansion Program: An Analysis of the Cost of Expanding the Navy 
from 500 to 600 Ships,” (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, Apr. 7, 1976), p. 10. 
Admiral Zumwalt’s successor as Chief of Naval Operations Adm. 
James L. Holloway III, is equally concerned about declining U.S. 
naval capabilities. He believes that the fleet today is only 60 to 70 
percent as effective against the Soviet threat today as the fleet in 
1967 was against the Soviet threat in 1967.8 Testifying before the 
House Armed Services Committee, he said that at the current rate 
of expansion of Soviet naval capability, the balance of maritime superi- 
ority will tip in favor of the Russians within the next 5 to 10 years, 
83 Ibid. 
84Zumwalt, “High-Low”, op. cit. 
85 Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Mar. 2, 1976. See: U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Criti- 
cal Materials, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 11500, Washington D.C., March 1976, p. 647. 
