598 
if the United States were simply to maintain the status quo of our 
current force structure.’ Holloway stated that if the United States 
is not to surrender what superiority we have at sea, the fleet has 
to be rebuilt starting this year, because it takes an average of 5 
years for an authorized construction program to become operational 
in the fleet.8? To carry out its missions properly, the Navy, in his 
view, needs a balanced fleet of about 600 ships. To achieve that 
goal in about 15 years, slightly more than 19 ships need to be con- 
structed annually in addition to the 88 new ships already authorized 
by the end of 1976.88 The main difference between the composition 
of a 500-ship Navy (compared with the current 477), and his proposed 
600-ship Navy, is in the procurement of an additional 51 escorts, 
19 attack submarines, and 11 replenishment ships.*? The expanded 
program would cost an estimated $17.7 billion more than the cost 
of maintaining a 500-ship Navy. (See Table 4.) The force proposed 
by the Chief of Naval Operations would be a two-ocean Navy, one 
which could prevail in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and which would 
carry out its responsibilities against the anticipated Soviet threat under 
the circumstances of a two-ocean war. In addition, the Navy would 
be able to maintain sea lines of communication with South America.” 
It would include some of the new ships proposed by Admiral Zumwalt 
in Project 60 to strengthen sea control capabilities. 
A number of other proposals for future naval construction programs 
have been presented by both Navy and civilian experts. Vice Adm. 
George P. Steele, former commander the the 7th Fleet, maintains 
that the best way to counter the Soviet naval threat is by emphasizing 
the construction of more attack submarines. The U.S. submarines, 
using torpedoes and in the future guided-missiles, are said to be the 
most effective weapon in destroying enemy surface combatants. The 
only adversary the submarine really need fear, according to Steele, 
is another and better submarine, down in the sea with it, using the 
same advantage of mobility and strength. The admiral, himself a 
former submarine commander, maintains that U.S. submarines are 
markedly superior to Soviet submarines, and that deploying them in 
large numbers will put the United States in an offensive, and the 
U.S.S.R. in a defensive, position.*! Not all of the attack submarines 
need be of the expensive, high-performance type of the current fleet; 
many could be less expensive, limited mission submarines. They 
should, however, all be nuclear because nuclear submarines are quieter 
and can operate effectively submerged for at least 60 days. Diesel 
submarines are quieter when operating on batteries, but they have 
to snorkel periodically. 
Vice Admiral Steele believes that the construction of aircraft car- 
riers and strike cruisers should be deemphasized. Instead, there is 
a need to design new surface ships which can absorb punishment 
better than our current surface fleet and still be able to fight. Finally, 
86 Ibid., p. 632. 
87 [bid., 
88 Alva M. Bowen, Jr., U.S. Naval Expansion Program: An Analysis of the Cost of Expanding the 
Navy from 500 to 600 Ships, Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, Apr. 7, 1976, p. 10. 
Ss Vbid-, .p: 10. 
®° Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 11500, pt. 4, op. cit., p. 648. 
%! Vice Adm. George P. Steele (ret.), ““A Fleet to Match our Real Need,’’ Washington Post, May 
16, 1976. . 
me 
