600 
nel for such missions. By combining the new surveillance capabilities 
with the new capabilities for precision guided missiles, the U.S. Air 
Force could significantly enhance U.S. ability to control the seas.1° 
Thus, with certain modification in aircraft and training programs, the 
Air Force might be able to cooperate with the Navy in search and 
identification-electronic warfare, tactical deception, attack against sur- 
face and air units, and aerial minelaying. Air Force resources could 
be trained for tasks which complement and supplement sea control 
operations and for which inherent capability already exists, according 
to General Ginsburgh. 1°! 
Admiral Zumwalt would like to go further and provide for some, 
if not all, of the Air Force’s tactical air wings to be carrier capable, 
so that the United States would be able to deploy optimal airpower 
in a typical crisis.‘ This proposal, however, would require an entirely 
new design of aircraft. 
The foregoing proposals illustrate the dilemma of the U.S. Navy. 
The Soviet Navy has become a serious threat to U.S. sea control 
and power projection in areas of vital importance to the Western 
Alliance. The U.S. Navy has to respond to this threat and still remain 
within politically acceptable budget limits. Various experts have sug- 
gested response to the Soviet threat, but their views are sometimes 
diametrically opposed, as, for example, the Steele and Taft proposals. 
Adding to the dilemma is the rapidity with which technology is ad- 
vancing in every conceivable area, while ship construction leadtimes 
continue to grow due to the sophistication of modern combatants. 
Hence, ships commissioned today may not meet the requirements 
of the 1980’s and 1990’s when they are to be deployed. 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. MERCHANT MARINE CAPABILITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
A nation’s seapower is determined not only by the weapons and 
armed forces with which it can affect events at sea but also by 
its merchant marine, fishing fleet, and oceanographic fleet, and by 
its maritime outlook and traditions. Admiral Mahan perceived the 
sea aS a great highway or a wide commons which provides nations 
having access to it with a means of transport that is easier and cheaper 
than any which exists across land.’ In fact, Admiral Mahan con- 
sidered the merchant marine of such overwhelming importance te 
the concept of seapower that in his view a nation without a significant 
merchant marine had no need for a navy.'** The existence of a U.S. 
100 Tid. 
191 Ibid. 
10? Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, “High-Low”, op. cit., p. 4. Zumwalt points out that in three of the four 
crises curing the time he was Chief of Naval Operations (Jordan 1970, India-Pakistani war of 1971, 
and the Yom Kippur war of 1973), the U.S. Air Force was totally incapable of playing a role due to 
lack of airfields; only carrier aviation could be brought to bear in these areas. 
103 Alfred T. Mahan, op. cit., p. 25. 
'*“Tbid., p. 26. It is interesting to compare Mahan’s remarks on the decline of the U.S. Navy in the 
latter part of the 19th century with the current situation. Mahan wrote in 1890: ‘“‘The ships that thus 
sail to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possible, be followed by 
the protection of their country throughout the voyage. This protection in time of war must be ex- 
tended by armed shipping. The necessity of a Navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, 
therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of na- 
tion which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a brand of the military establish- 
ment. As the United States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has dis- 
appeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical con- 
sequences. When for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will 
Teappear to compel the revival of the war fleet.” 
