603 
Soviet merchant marine policy can only be understood within the 
context of the Soviet concept of seapower. No element of seapower 
can be allowed to develop without regard for the impact it will have 
on other elements. It has been suggested that because of their deter- 
mination to lessen the economic ties between Third World countries 
and the West, and to further their political and national security 
interests, the Soviet Union has entered almost every conceivable over- 
seas trade route, regardless of the economics of the venture. The 
minister of the Soviet merchant fleet has openly admitted that 
maritime transport has carried out a number of responsible assign- 
ments of the Communist Party, bearing not only an economic, but 
also a political character.!!° 
Unlike Japan, Great Britain, or Norway, the Soviet Union has not 
allowed its merchant marine to be influenced by purely commercial 
forces. In a recent article on the Soviet merchant marine, Prof. 
Richard Ackley lists three noncommercial purposes of the Soviet 
merchant marine: 
First, to insure that large quantities of arms and equipment can 
be supplied to client nations, at short notice if required. 
Second, to provide the lift for followup forces in the event of 
Overseas interventions. 
Third, to serve, through the presence of its ships and their compa- 
nies in distant parts of the world, as an influence-building instrument 
of policy.'"? 
The Soviet Union today possesses a merchant marine that can effi- 
ciently and effectively perform both its commercial peacetime and 
wartime objectives. They have proved in Vietnam that they have 
a growing capability for long range sealift that can sustain friendly 
forces over extended periods, while enjoying immunity from retalia- 
tion.!!2 Such efforts provide the Soviets with sufficient shipping and 
operational experience to be able to undertake distant limited war 
operations herself someday.’ 
Many Western observers argue that the Soviet merchant marine 
is no match for the efficient, specialized merchant fleets of the 
Western maritime powers. On the other hand, the small Soviet general 
cargo vessels, with self-unloading equipment, are particularly suitable 
for trade with the developing countries which have generally less 
developed port facilities. Professor Ackley argues that, although the 
economic gain from trade with developing countries may be modest, 
“it appears that establishing a foothold in the economic and political 
structure of these countries is a motivating force for Soviet actions’’.'™* 
In times of war, dry cargo vessels with self-unloading equipment are 
10Transportation Institute, Analysis of the Direct Impact of the Merchant Marine on National 
Security, Washington, D.C., May 1976, p. 5-1. 
11 Richard T. Ackley, “The Soviet Merchant Marine,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 102, 
No. 2/876, February 1976, p. 26. 
12When the United States mined Haiphong, Soviet merchant vessels continued to unload their 
cargo at sea onto small barges. 
113 [bid., pp. 33, 34. Dr. Ackley maintains that evidence exists to demonstrate the Soviet merchant 
marine’s capability to support deployed naval squadrons. He points at Soviet warship probes into the 
Caribbean Sea and cruises off the Hawaiian Islands indicating that the merchant marine can provide 
necessary logistic support to deployed naval formations, and infers from this that similar support to 
intervention forces may be possible. Dr. Ackley also argues that the limiting factor is the lack of 
Soviet air support needed for the projection of military forces in the face of sophisticated opposition. 
The deployment of the Soviet carrier Kiev may be the beginning of the required air support. 
"4Tbid., p. 35. 
