609 
With limited subsidies available, MARAD has to meet defense needs 
. for wartime and major contingencies as well as make peacetime con- 
tributions to the maritime industry. If the United States were entirely 
dependent on foreign shipping, groups of maritime nations unsym- 
pathetic to U.S. objectives, or desirous of obtaining political ad- 
vantage, would be capable of exercising undue leverage. '44 For exam- 
ple, OPEC oil importers intend to increase their control over the 
shipping of their oil to the industrial nations. It is conceivable that 
at some point during the 1980’s (when the United States has been 
projected to be importing between 4.5 and 5.5 million barrels of 
oil per day from OPEC countries), those countries may be in a posi- 
tion to control a significant percentage of the tanker market.'*° Con- 
trol of tanker tonnage by oil producers, along with wellhead control, 
can assure the success of a potential embargo through denial of access 
to alternative sources. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Robert J. 
Blackwell argues that the United States must consider the situation 
it would be in if it were without the tanker resources that have 
been provided for under the maritime program.}*6 
It has been argued that the United States does not need a subsidized 
merchant marine in view of the fact that U.S. citizens own 461 ships 
(or 31.5 million deadweight tons) which sail under a foreign flag. 
Most of the 461 ships are tankers, combination vessels, and dry bulk 
carriers.147 
Dr. Bennett maintains that these ships cannot be counted on to 
meet national security needs. He testified in 1975 that: 
In theory, these vessels would come back to the United States in any conditions 
that required additional shipping. However, there are several points to consider in 
this matter. First, the fleet on the nation of which the vessel is operating could be 
a dominant factor since that country may not agree with a particular U.S. action 
and may order the ship to return to a neutral port or to actually commandeer the 
ship if it is in an area where the nation has some control or can look to friendly 
powers. Additionally, the loyalty of the crew could be open for question. As we 
have found out from instances in World War II, it is relatively easy to sabotage 
a merchant vessel and would require only one or two disloyal crew members to render 
a ship useless. Finally, there would be the question of manning it with U.S. merchant 
crews. The rapidly aging merchant union personnel and declining number of ships 
point to a possible difficulty in the future in obtaining sufficient crews to take over 
these vessels. In view of these considerations, the ‘Effective U.S. controlled fleet” 
should not be considered a substitute for U.S.-flag shipping to accommodate defense 
needs. Further, the vast majority of these vessels are tankers or ore carriers. While 
these vessels may well prove valuable for transporting critical materials in times of 
crisis, their direct military utility is limited.’** 
Negative experiences with foreign shipping during the Vietnam war 
could be minimized because the United States had a larger general 
cargo merchant marine then which meant that the Military Sealift 
Command could be very selective in selecting the foreign ships to 
be used, but, even then, the situation was not considered satifac- 
tory.'* 
1441bid., p. 379. Testimony by Assistant Secretary of Commerce Robert J. Blackwell. 
M45 For oil import figures, see: U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, ““Towards Pro- 
ject Interdependence: Energy in the Coming Decade,”’ Washington, D.C., December 1975, p. 69. 
146 Hearings on Merchant Marine Oversight 1975, op. cit., p. 380. 
47 Ibid., pp. 186, 187. 
M48 Ibid., pp. 11 and 12. 
M91bid., p. 12. 
