610 
On the other hand, Philip J. Loree, chairman of the Federation 
of American Controlled Shipping, maintains that American-owned ves- 
sels can carry all the oil and raw materials the United States needs 
to import, and that the chances of sailors refusing to sail is slim 
as long as they are paid well.1*° 
Most observers, however, agree on the need for a domestic 
merchant marine and shipyard capacity. In view of differences of 
opinion on the merits of reliance on NATO and U.S.-owned foreign 
flag ships, they differ in their recommendations as to the size and 
composition of the merchant fleet. Within the current construction 
subsidy program, the Navy would like to see more emphasis on general 
dry cargo vessels and other cargo vessels (such as roll-on/roll-off 
ships) which are of immediate importance to their needs. An analysis 
of future tanker needs to carry U.S. oil imports from a variety of 
sources concluded that out of 46.7 million deadweight tons of tanker 
capacity needed in 1980 (in case the United States were to import 
8 million barrels of oil per day), the United States will be able to 
carry 6.4 million deadweight tons, or 13.6 percent. Assuming max- 
imum oil imports of 12 million barrels per day, 8.1 out 108.5, or 
7.4 percent would be carried in U.S. flag ships. Many observers would 
agree that these are rather low percentages, particularly in view of 
the fact that a significant shift is now underway in terms of the 
transfer tonnage to OPEC countries. Many observers are worried that 
reliance on foreign flag tankers to the extent shown could subject 
the United States to shipping boycotts and freight rate discrimination. 
“ The U.S. merchant marine fleet provides the United States with a 
counter to such policies. So long as U.S.-flag carriers operate in these 
trades, our trading partners cannot gain commercial advantage by 
restricting or manipulating ocean transportation facilities and rates.’ 
Prior to the recent forecasts of staggering United States oil imports 
during the 1980’s, a 1974 study by Robert Nathan Associates for 
the Senate National Ocean Policy Study estimated that the volume 
of U.S. overseas trade would grow, without additional stimuli, between 
60 to 70 percent in the period from 1972 to 1985.'? Without addi- 
tional stimuli, it is unlikely that U.S. ship construction will keep up 
with projected overseas trade increases. Consequently, the volume 
of overseas trade carried in U.S. flagships is likely to decline even 
further during the coming decade. The Nathan study estimates that 
freight, insurance, and terminal costs associated with the rapid increase 
in overseas trade will rise from $9.6 billion in 1972 to $16.4 and 
$18.6 billion by 1985.53 In 1974, U.S. flag vessels carried about 
20 percent of the value of our overseas trade. Even if that figure 
were maintained, overseas transportation could cause an outflow of 
some $7 to $8 billion. 
The demise of the U.S. merchant marine is reflected in the continu- 
ing decline in employment opportunities. According to Rear Adm. 
Sam M. Moore, commander of the Military Sealift Command, U.S. 
employment in the merchant marine declined from 115,000 at the 
150 [bid., pp. 186, 187. 
151 [bid., p. 383. 
152U.§. Senate, Committee on Commerce, National Ocean Policy Study. The Economic Value of 
Ocean Resources to the United States, Washington, D.C., December 1974, p. 89. 
'S3[bid., p. 93. 
